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Shareholder Collaboration 
Jill E. Fisch* and Simone M. Sepe** 
Two models of the firm dominate corporate law. Under the management-
power model, decision-making power rests primarily with corporate insiders 
(officers and directors). The competing shareholder-power model defends 
increased shareholder power to limit managerial authority. Both models view 
insiders and shareholders as engaged in a competitive struggle for corporate 
power in which corporate law functions to promote operational efficiency while 
limiting managerial agency costs. 
As scholars and judges continue to debate the appropriate balance of power 
between shareholders and insiders, corporate practice has moved on. 
Increasingly, the insider–shareholder dynamic is collaborative, not competitive. 
This Article traces the development of insider–shareholder collaboration, 
explaining how collaboration, which originated in the venture capital context, 
has expanded into public companies. This expansion, the Article argues, is due 
to the increasing importance of partial information problems that, for many 
firms, have grown costlier than agency costs. Using insights from the economics 
of information, the Article shows how collaboration promotes the production and 
aggregation of information from insiders and shareholders, adding value that is 
lost under unilateral decision-making. 
Modern corporate law and corporate governance are poorly prepared to 
handle insider–shareholder collaboration, however. The collaborative process 
places novel demands on traditional obligations of confidentiality and fiduciary 
duty as well as complicating the meaning of conflicts of interest. These concepts 
must be rethought to enable productive collaboration while limiting the potential 
that the collaborative process can be manipulated to permit collusive behavior 
or self-dealing. 
Introduction 
Since the groundbreaking work of Ronald Coase in 1937,1 law and 
economics scholars have debated theories of the firm and their application to 
 
* Saul A. Fox Distinguished Professor of Business Law, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School. 
** Professor of Law and Finance, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona and 
Toulouse School of Economics. We are grateful for comments received at the American Law & 
Economics Association Annual Meeting, the Law & Economics Seminar at Duke Law School, the 
Center for Financial Studies in the House of Finance at Goethe University, the lunchtime seminar 
in law at Université du Luxembourg, the Institutional Investor Activism and Engagement 
Conference at Bar Ilan and Hebrew Universities, and the SIDE––ISLE 2017––13th Annual 
Conference at LUMSA University in Rome. 
1. See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
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corporate law. Two models have come to dominate: the management-power 
model and the shareholder-power model. The management-power model, 
consistent with Coase’s account of the firm as a hierarchical organization,2 
emphasizes the board’s decision-making authority.3 The competing 
shareholder-power model deemphasizes management authority in favor of 
accountability and defends greater shareholder power to ensure that corporate 
insiders—both directors and managers—are held fully accountable.4 
Proponents of both models agree on two things, however. First, they 
regard managerial moral hazard as the central problem of corporate law.5 
Second, both assume that insiders and shareholders are engaged in a 
competitive struggle for corporate power.6 Under this shared assumption, 
corporate law entails a narrative of recurring battles with winners and losers. 
Meanwhile, the corporate world has moved on. Shareholders are no 
longer dispersed and passive but empowered, yet they are using their greater 
power not to wrest control but to work jointly with insiders, bringing new 
 
2. Id. at 390–92. 
3. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 557–59 (2003) (describing exclusive board authority as 
essential to overcome the collective action problem affecting corporate production); Eugene F. 
Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 313 (1983) 
(emphasizing the role of the board as a decision controller charged with monitoring and ratifying 
management decisions). 
4. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833, 865–70 (2005) (arguing for giving shareholders the power to initiate changes in the 
corporate charter and the state of incorporation); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder 
Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 694–711 (2007) (advocating reforming corporate elections to give 
more power to shareholders). 
5. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 248–49 (1999) (arguing that the dominant view in contemporary discussions 
of corporate governance is that the “central economic problem addressed by corporation law is 
reducing ‘agency costs’ by keeping directors and managers faithful to shareholders’ interests”); 
Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J. 1554, 1624 
(2015) (“[S]hareholders’ ability to minimize managerial agency costs is one of the most important 
challenges in the corporate governance of widely held firms.”). Berle and Means first observed that 
the separation of ownership from control in the public corporation had the potential to generate 
managerial opportunism and reduce firm value. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE 
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 84–89 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. reprt. ed. 
1982) (1932). Jensen and Meckling later formalized the intuition, identifying managerial moral 
hazard as the primary agency cost arising from the information asymmetry between insiders and 
shareholders. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
6. See, e.g., Jay B. Kesten, Towards a Moral Agency Theory of the Shareholder Bylaw Power, 
85 TEMP. L. REV. 485, 486–87 (2013) (describing corporate bylaws “like hostile takeovers, deal 
protection devices, and proxy access fights before them—the new leading edge of a decades-long 
struggle between shareholders and management over the allocation of decision-making authority in 
public companies”); Michael Klausner, Fact and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance, 65 
STAN. L. REV. 1325, 1328–29 (2013) (discussing the long-term battle between shareholders and 
managers and suggesting that in recent years shareholders seem to have gained the upper hand in 
this battle). 
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information and insights to operational decision-making.7 In other words, 
increasingly, the insider–shareholder dynamic in the modern corporation is 
collaborative. 
Insider–shareholder collaboration is occurring in multiple ways—
through private engagement between large shareholders and corporate 
executives and directors, through joint initiatives aimed at developing and 
promoting the spread of shared governance principles, through 
“constructivist” activist interventions oriented to the creation of long-term 
value, and through the increasing use of hybrid boards of directors to 
formalize shareholder inputs over operational decision-making. Although we 
do not claim that collaboration has displaced hostile activism, we document 
how the trend toward board–shareholder collaboration is spreading rapidly 
and systemically.8 
What explains the growth of collaboration? Using insights from 
epistemic models of collective wisdom and the economics of information, 
this Article demonstrates that collaboration promotes the production and 
aggregation of the “partial” and “complementary” information that insiders 
and shareholders are likely to possess in today’s knowledge-rich economy. 
Because of this distinctive property, collaboration offers a mechanism for 
enhancing firm value that unilateral decision-making by either insiders or 
shareholders cannot provide. 
The Article also explains how this mechanism can be traced back to the 
venture capital (VC) context, in which founders and investors have long-
developed structures that promote shared power and joint decision-making—
collaborating with rather than competing against each other. Indeed, in the 
VC context, which emphasizes innovation and rapid growth, the traditional 
corporate law concern of minimizing agency costs is secondary to what we 
call “partial information” problems.9 These problems arise when the nature 
 
7. We distinguish collaboration from communication in that it involves shareholders and 
insiders working together rather than simply exchanging information. See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, 
Collaborative Advantage: The Art of Alliances, HARV. BUS. REV., July–Aug. 1994, at 96, 97 
(defining collaboration as “creating new value together”); see also Debra Mashek, Collaboration: 
It’s Not What You Think, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com/ 
intl/blog/relationships-intimate-and-more/201602/collaboration-its-not-what-you-think?amp 
[https://perma.cc/6HJF-AVAJ] (distinguishing collaboration from networking, coordinating, and 
cooperating). 
8. One article suggests that the relationship between activists and targeted companies is moving 
toward a “new, collaborative (or at least less adversarial) conception,” but the analysis is largely 
limited to the hedge fund context and to the implication for golden leash practices. Gregory H. Shill, 
The Golden Leash and the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1246, 1256–59, 1261–64 
(2017). In contrast, this Article examines the potential for a broader-scope collaborative model of 
the insider–shareholder relationship. 
9. Asymmetric information no longer is only “unilateral,” with outsiders necessarily standing 
at an informational disadvantage relative to insiders, but is increasingly “bilateral,” with both 
insiders and outsiders holding private information not available to the other party. See Frederik 
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of the production process is so knowledge intensive that a single individual 
or groups of individuals—including the firm’s founders, officers, and 
directors—is unlikely to possess the relevant information to respond 
effectively to all business challenges. Instead, both insiders and outsiders—
such as VC funds—likely possess information that is not available to the 
other party but is vital to the firm’s success. VC firms access these different 
sets of information through collaborative decision-making structures. 
Two factors explain the spread of collaboration to the publicly traded 
firm. First, the information dependency of the public firm business model has 
increased as new technology firms enter the public markets and older firms 
modernize their business plans. Second, the rise of empowered and actively 
informed investors offers a new source of well-resourced and sophisticated 
firm-specific knowledge from outside the corporation. Growing market 
concentration has led to the emergence of institutional investors with large 
stakes and both the incentive and sophistication to acquire valuable 
information.10 These investors have increasingly come to resemble VC 
investors in that they are likely to possess information that is not just different 
but also “complementary” to that of insiders. This means that the 
informational whole of insider and outsider information is arguably greater 
than the sum of its individual parts so that the aggregation of this information 
adds to firm value. It follows that public firms have begun to incorporate both 
the inside information of insiders and the outside knowledge of investors—
similar to what happens in the VC context. 
Despite these dramatic transformations, corporate law scholars have 
paid virtually no attention to insider–shareholder collaboration. This Article 
attempts to remedy the gap. As a descriptive matter, it offers the first 
taxonomy of the various forms of collaboration that we increasingly observe 
in corporate practice. It then draws on the theory of cooperative games to 
demonstrate how the corporate structure provides appropriate incentives for 
the generation and aggregation of partial and complementary information. 
First, the equity contract efficiently addresses collaboration’s economic 
rights by ensuring that the surplus created by collaboration is shared by both 
collaborating and noncollaborating investors, as well as equity-compensated 
managers. Second, the corporate structure efficiently allows parties to design 
control rights so as to reflect a party’s marginal contribution to the surplus 
created by collaboration, preserving the incentives to invest optimally in the 
production of complementary information and the collaborative process more 
generally. 
 
Andersson, Adverse Selection and Bilateral Asymmetric Information, 74 J. ECON. 173, 174–75 
(2001) (examining bilateral asymmetric information in the insurance context). For clarity, this 
Article uses the term “partial information” in the place of “bilateral asymmetric information.” 
10. See, e.g., Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-
concentration of Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 313 (2017) 
(documenting the growth and increasing ownership concentration of large-asset managers). 
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Corporate law rules are poorly prepared to handle insider–shareholder 
collaboration, however. These rules typically limit shareholders to 
communicating information to insiders rather than collaborating.11 Although 
board representation offers public company shareholders a vehicle to 
collaborate, shareholder representatives face questions about the scope of 
their fiduciary duties and the potential for conflicts of interest. Effective 
collaboration may also result in greater shareholder access to firm-specific 
information, but with that access comes concerns over the misuse of that 
information, either to obtain a trading advantage or for other forms of self-
dealing. Finally, collaboration creates the possibility of collusion in which 
collaborating investors and insiders act opportunistically to further their own 
interests at the expense of overall firm value. Although a complete analysis 
of these concerns is beyond the scope of this Article, we argue that the way 
in which they are treated under current corporate law rules should be 
rethought if the goal is enabling productive collaboration while limiting the 
potential for abuse. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the traditional 
confrontational model of corporate law. Part II describes the shift from 
confrontation to collaboration and explains how collaboration has migrated 
from the VC context to the publicly traded company, providing a first 
taxonomy of the several forms of insider–shareholder collaboration. Part III 
defends the normative desirability of the collaborative model, explaining how 
collaboration responds to a growing partial information problem and using 
insights from game theory to demonstrate how the corporate form can 
preserve the individual incentives of insiders and shareholders to collaborate. 
Part IV identifies how the collaborative model presents new challenges for 
corporate law. 
I. Confrontational Theories of the Firms 
Traditional “confrontational” models of the corporation assume that the 
essential task of corporate law is devising the appropriate allocation of power 
between insiders and shareholders to minimize the cost of managerial moral 
hazard. Although commentators differ in their views as to the appropriate 
allocation of such power—with some supporting managerial primacy and 
others favoring empowered shareholders—the dominant narrative in either 
case is that insiders and shareholders are engaged in a competitive struggle 
for corporate power. 
 
11. See infra section IV(A)(1). 
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A. The Management-Power Model 
The traditional management-power model, reflected in the writings of 
Martin Lipton,12 Stephen Bainbridge,13 and the Delaware courts,14 relies on 
the board of directors to centralize corporate decision-making authority and 
to address the problem of managerial moral hazard. The model “free[s] up 
managers to manage.”15 Shareholders, in this model, specialize in risk-
bearing but are not involved in operational issues.16 The key arguments for 
granting ultimate authority to the board include not only shareholder 
collective action problems and asymmetric information but also concerns 
about shareholder short-termism, self-dealing, and conflicts of interest.17 
This account of the corporation finds its roots in the managerialist era 
that began at the end of World War II and ended around 1980.18 The 
managers that oversaw the growth of the modern industrial corporation were 
brought in to “hire capital from the investor”19 and enjoyed a nonreviewable 
power of fiat.20 Shareholders, on the other hand, were dispersed and passive, 
with few mechanisms to overcome collective action problems, and hence 
dismissed as mere capital providers.21 Even back then, as attested by Berle’s 
and Means’s classic treatise,22 management power was seen as problematic, 
 
12. See, e.g., Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 733, 757–58 (2007) (defining the “the director-centric Delaware way”); Martin Lipton, 
Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 130–31 (1979) (defending board 
power in the takeover context). 
13. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 560, 569 (describing the board’s exclusive authority 
as its undisturbed “power of fiat”). 
14. See, e.g., Jack B. Jacobs, “Patient Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive 
It?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1657–61 (2011) (attributing national economic decline to, 
among other causes, the erosion of board power); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate 
Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1763 (2006) (explaining that the traditionalist Delaware way is “the 
empowerment of centralized management to make and pursue risky business decisions through 
diverse means”). 
15. Strine, supra note 14, at 1764. 
16. Fama & Jensen, supra note 3, at 309. 
17. See Lipton & Savitt, supra note 12, at 744–47 (explaining dangers of conflicts of interest 
from interest-group shareholders and short-termism caused by vocal, institutional shareholders); 
Strine, supra note 14, at 1764 (describing traditional managerialist’s concern for selfish interests of 
institutional investors). 
18. See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 482–83 (1977) (describing the managerial revolution); 
GERALD F. DAVIS, MANAGED BY THE MARKETS 72–77 (2009) (describing managerial dominance 
during this period). 
19. Bayless Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1489 (1958). 
20. See ADOLF A. BERLE, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REPUBLIC 169–70 (1963) (noting that 
before 1920 “owner-managers considered their prerogatives absolute”). 
21. Adolf A. Berle, Property, Production and Revolution: A Preface to the Revised Edition of 
ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY, 
at vii, xxvi–vii (Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. rev. ed. 1968) (1932). 
22. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 21, at 207. 
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but under the Coasian assumption that the market could not provide an 
environment conducive to complex production,23 it was deemed unavoidable. 
Since the early 1980s, however, a variety of developments have limited 
the scope of management power. The hostile takeover offered, for the first 
time, a vehicle through which capital market discipline could be used to 
constrain managerial agency costs by demonstrating the transformative 
potential of shareholders’ stock market purchasing power.24 And after the 
demise of takeovers, the rise of institutional investors and governance 
watchdogs intervened to provide a novel form of market discipline.25 The 
introduction of incentive compensation also increased the alignment between 
managers’ interests and maximization of firm value.26 And the emergence of 
independent directors led to greater monitoring of managers.27 
For management-power supporters, these developments heighten 
arguments to defend the model by providing incentives for managers to focus 
on the maximization of firm value and hold them accountable for doing so. 
These scholars also see these developments as strengthening the case for 
protecting management and the board from the potential interference of less-
informed investors.28 Not so for the defendants of the competing shareholder-
power model, as we shall see next. 
B. The Shareholder-Power Model 
The rise of the shareholder-power model can be traced back to the 
emergence of hostile takeovers. Indeed, takeovers led to a new way of 
thinking about the corporation, one largely shaped by the rise of the 
neoclassical theory of the firm. Rejecting centralized decision-making as a 
 
23. See Coase, supra note 1, at 392 (explaining that use of the firm can reduce the transaction 
costs associated with market transactions). 
24. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives 
from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1520–21 (1989) (describing the takeovers that arose in the 
1980s as “capital markets’ successful demand for the return of capital suboptimally invested”). 
25. David I. Walker, The Manager’s Share, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 592–93 (2005). 
26. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the 
Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 884, 896–97 (2002) (describing 
both the rise of incentive compensation and independent directors as adaptive responses to the 
managerial-friendly takeover standards set by Delaware courts). 
27. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: 
Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1518 (2007) (defending 
the increased use of independent directors as a value-increasing innovation of the post-takeover 
era); see also Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 270–71 (1997) 
(describing the rise of the monitoring board). 
28. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction 
to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 455 (2014) 
(describing the view of some commentators that “the best way to ensure that corporations generate 
wealth for diversified stockholders is to give the managers of corporations a strong hand to take 
risks and implement business strategies without constant disruption by shifting stock market 
sentiment”). 
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distinctive trait of totalitarianism,29 neoclassicists viewed the firm as a web 
of contractual relationships among individuals, whose ongoing transactions 
were efficiently coordinated by the price mechanism.30 The introduction by 
Jensen and Meckling of the principal–agent model of the firm formalized and 
directed the change of approach.31 Easterbrook’s and Fischel’s con-
tractarianism refined the model for corporate law, using it to support a 
sequence of normative assertions that revolved around a view of shareholders 
as the primary corporate constituents.32 
The shareholders’ claim to primacy was put to test in the wake of the 
fall of the hostile takeover and the introduction of legal and governance 
responses empowering incumbent managers to adopt antitakeover 
measures.33 These reforms prompted commentators fiercely to debate 
whether management’s use of antitakeover measures was appropriate or 
whether management should instead remain passive and allow shareholders 
the freedom to decide whether to accept a hostile bid.34 The scene was set for 
the battle between shareholders and managers over corporate control. 
That battle intensified in the early 2000s, when the case for shareholder 
primacy expanded beyond the control contest. Lucian Bebchuk was perhaps 
the most vocal commentator to argue that shareholders should be given 
greater power, including powers that were currently reserved to corporate 
insiders.35 In recent years, steady increases in shareholder concentration and 
activism have led to greater shareholder control over corporate decision-
making and increased issuer responsiveness to shareholder demands. As put 
by one commentator, for the first time since the beginning of the battle 
 
29. See DAVID CIEPLEY, LIBERALISM IN THE SHADOW OF TOTALITARIANISM 87–88 (2006) 
(describing the role of totalitarianism in mid-twentieth-century American views on economic 
reform). 
30. Armen A. Alchian, Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization, in 
ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK 73, 73–74 (1977). 
31. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5. 
32. See generally FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). 
33. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with 
Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 864–65 (1993) (describing the legal and 
political barriers as resulting in the “demise of the market for corporate control”); see also Bengt 
Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United States: 
Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2001, at 121, 132 (examining the 
changed landscape for takeovers and mergers and suggesting “anti-takeover legislation has had an 
effect”). 
34. Compare Ronald J. Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural 
Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REV. 775, 821–22 (1982) (criticizing the use of 
antitakeover defenses), with Lipton, supra note 12, at 130–31 (defending the use of antitakeover 
defenses to protect board primacy). 
35. See supra note 4. 
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between shareholders and insiders over corporate power, the battle has come 
to favor shareholders rather than directors and managers.36 
C. The “Battle” Between Insiders and Shareholders 
Both the management-power model and the shareholder-power model 
assume that insiders and shareholders are engaged in a competitive struggle 
for corporate power. The language of combat goes back to the “takeover 
battles” of the 1970s, which featured “corporate raiders,” “white knights,” 
“scorched earth takeover defenses,” “poison pills,” and “greenmail.”37 
Although the conflicts between shareholders and insiders today rarely 
involve hostile contests for corporate control, the struggle for corporate 
power has, if possible, intensified. Hostile activists have taken the place of 
corporate raiders, and the ongoing engagement between activists and issuers 
continues to be described as a “war.”38 
The language of combat persists. A white paper directed at corporate 
boards, for example, termed majority voting “the next battleground in the 
corporate governance wars between the activist institutional shareholder 
community and ‘Corporate America.’”39 Similarly, Fortune magazine 
described Trian’s recent activist campaign at DuPont as “war.”40 A letter sent 
to American CEOs by Blackrock’s Larry Fink in 2014 expressed concerns 
that activists are out to “destroy jobs.”41 And Delaware Supreme Court Chief 
Justice Leo Strine’s recent essay describes activist “wolf packs” and asked, 
“Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?”42 
The confrontational approach is likewise reflected in the 
characterization of the objectives of each model. Adherents to the 
management-power model defend it in terms of the need to protect the 
 
36. Klausner, supra note 6, at 1329 (“In recent years, however, the balance of power seems to 
have shifted toward shareholders. After a thirty-year delay, and key changes in the background law, 
governance structures that shareholders advocate have been adopted.”). 
37. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 34, at 775–76 (describing target management tactics as 
“drawing directly on military jargon”). 
38. Michael D. Goldhaber, Marty Lipton’s War on Hedge Fund Activists, AM. LAW. (Mar. 30, 
2015), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/almID/1202721058301/ [https://perma.cc/77PU-
HZ3T]. 
39. Majority Voting for Directors: The Latest Corporate Governance Initiative, LATHAM & 
WATKINS: M&A DEAL COMMENT. (Dec. 9, 2005), https://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/ 
pub1437_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/HU4X-GVQA]. 
40. Stephen Gandel, DuPont Nearly Lost Its War with Activist Nelson Peltz, FORTUNE (June 4, 
2015), http://fortune.com/2015/06/04/dupont-nelson-peltz-vote/ [https://perma.cc/QE2K-2B9K]. 
41. William Alden, Laurence Fink Says Activist Investing Can ‘Destroy Jobs,’ N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Dec. 11, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/12/11/laurence-fink-says-activist-
investing-can-destroy-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/9VJM-NSA4] (quoting comments by Mr. Fink at a 
DealBook conference). 
42. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on 
Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1875 
(2017). 
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corporation from the short-term interests of activist shareholders.43 And 
shareholder advocates persevere in their call to increase shareholder power 
to reduce managerial agency costs.44 In other words, both sides view the 
preservation of power as necessary to curb the tendencies of the opposition 
to destroy or appropriate firm value. 
It is a mistake to conclude, however, that a confrontational model is an 
inherent feature of corporate law. Black letter corporate law—whether 
statutory or case law—merely provides a starting point for managing the 
insider–shareholder relationship. Corporations respond to economic and 
legal developments through private ordering,45 adopting contractually based 
adjustments to statutory default terms and changing external circumstances. 
This adjustment process has accommodated collaborative, in addition to 
confrontational, interactions between shareholders and corporate insiders, 
most notably in the venture capital context. Most importantly, as we will 
show below, the changes that have occurred in corporate production and the 
role of shareholders have prompted the adoption of similar collaborative 
structures in an increasing number of public corporations in recent years, 
denuding confrontational models of their descriptive value. 
II. From Confrontation to Collaboration 
A. Venture Capital and the Emergence of Collaboration 
Consistent with adversarial theories of the corporation, confrontational 
corporate governance arrangements provide for unilateral power, by either 
the board or the shareholders. In the managerialist era, for example, 
corporations reflected unilateral managerial power. At the opposite extreme, 
we find the hostile-activist context, in which hedge funds, as empowered 
shareholders, can often shape a firm’s business policy unilaterally. A 
confrontational allocation of corporate power is not the sole possibility, 
however. Corporate law structures insider and shareholder inputs, but it does 
not dictate the details of this process; those details are left to private ordering. 
And under private ordering, collaboration is an alternative to confrontation. 
 
43. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1093–96 (2015) (providing an overview of the scholarly positions defending 
what they refer to as the “myopic-activists claim”). 
44. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1643–44 (2013) (rejecting the claim that shareholder activism promotes 
short-termism). 
45. Private ordering occupies the space of contractual freedom that is available under default 
rules and encompasses both contracting within the corporation and discrete market contracting. See 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1426 
(1989) (describing the corporation as “a set of implicit and explicit contracts”). 
FISCH.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/1/20  6:36 PM 
2020] Shareholder Collaboration 873 
VC firms offer the paradigmatic example of the collaborative 
alternative.46 VC founders and investors routinely bargain for structures that 
provide for shared power and joint decision-making rather than unilateral 
decision-making authority by either insiders or investors.47 We argue that 
these collaborative structures respond to a distinctive feature of VC firms: 
the fact that they are typically invested in innovation and high growth.48 As 
Ron Gilson has explained, various features of VC-funded start-up firms make 
them particularly conducive to innovation.49 And innovative businesses are 
heavily dependent on information—both information about the firm’s 
business model, invention, or technology, and information about the 
relationship of the firm’s innovation to the existing industry. In such cases, 
both entrepreneurs and investors suffer from “partial information” problems; 
each is likely to possess valuable private information for matching firm-
specific innovation to the surrounding business environment, but only when 
that information is combined can it be fully exploited to foster a firm’s 
success. 
VC firms address this problem through collaborative decision-making 
structures that create incentives for all participants to develop and aggregate 
their partial information. Staged financing, the explicit provisions of joint 
control rights, and the appointment of constituency directors all offer 
examples of these collaborative structures. 
Staged financing provides for the incremental investment of capital over 
time, typically conditional on how a start-up progresses in relation to its 
 
46. Additional, although less salient, evidence of collaborative practices comes from incentive-
based management compensation and independent directors. See Gordon, supra note 27, at 1471 
(observing that independent directors can not only channel shareholder inputs but can also credibly 
check these inputs against insider measures of firm prospects); Kahan & Rock, supra note 26, at 
884, 896–97 (describing increased use of incentive compensation in response to takeover barriers). 
47. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: Preferred Stock and 
Corporate Control, 100 MICH. L. REV. 891, 920 (2002) (describing “shared control structure’s real 
world dominance over the alternative of VC control or hardwired control transfers”); Ronald J. 
Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55 STAN. 
L. REV. 1067, 1081 (2003) (“The venture capital fund-portfolio company contract stands the Berle-
Means problem on its head.”); D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital Contracting in the Information 
Age, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 133, 139 (1998) (describing the relationship between VC 
investors and entrepreneurs as a “cooperative relationship”). 
48. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 47, at 1068 (“The venture capital market thus provides a unique 
link between finance and innovation, providing start-up and early stage firms––organizational forms 
particularly well-suited to innovation––with capital market access that is tailored to the special task 
of financing these high-risk, high-return activities.”). 
49. See Ronald J. Gilson, Locating Innovation: The Endogeneity of Technology, Organizational 
Structure, and Financial Contracting, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 885, 900–04 (2010) (arguing that VC-
funded firms are well suited for dealing with high levels of risk); see also Elizabeth Pollman & 
Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 392 (2017) (observing that 
the success of many innovative firms involves regulatory entrepreneurship, which they define as 
pursuing a line of business that depends on changing the applicable law). 
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initial projection.50 Two collaborative features are inherent in this 
mechanism. First, staged financing necessarily presupposes an ongoing 
relationship between the investors and the entrepreneur that involves regular 
rather than sporadic communications as well as periodic consultation.51 
Indeed, only through frequent interactive exchanges with the entrepreneur 
can VC investors acquire the information needed to employ staged financing 
successfully as a means to minimize their investment risk.52 Second, staged 
financing implicitly provides for shared decision-making power between the 
investors and the entrepreneur. It does so by ensuring that decision-making 
power rests with the entrepreneur until it becomes optimal for this power to 
shift to the investors, enabling them to reclaim further authority through their 
control of subsequent funding.53 
VC contracts also typically provide for joint decision-making rights 
rather than vesting operational decision-making exclusively in the hands of 
either insiders or investors. For example, VC contracts frequently allocate 
control and monitoring rights to VC investors that are disproportionate to 
their equity share.54 VC investors also usually enjoy veto powers over 
fundamental corporate decisions so that crucial actions in the development 
of a start-up business require the consensus of both the entrepreneur and the 
investors.55 
Further, VC contracts routinely feature the appointment of constituency 
directors.56 Constituency directors are directors whose election to the board 
 
50. Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the 
Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 52–53 (2006); Charles R. Korsmo, Venture Capital and 
Preferred Stock, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1163, 1169–70 (2013). 
51. In the jargon of economists, staged financing presupposes a relational contract; that is, an 
agreement characterized by continuing interactive exchanges between the contracting parties. See 
generally Jonathan Levin, Relational Incentive Contracts, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 835 (2003) 
(discussing the structure of relational contracts). 
52. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 50, at 52 (explaining that staged financing allows VC investors 
to minimize the risk of investing in unfamiliar businesses by allowing them to observe progress); 
Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness, Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A Theory of Venture 
Capital-Financed Firms, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 65 (positing that staged financing reduces the risk 
to investments by an entrepreneur’s threat to quit the venture and from informational hazards). 
53. D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 323 (2005). 
Typically, control stays in the hands of the entrepreneur when the firm is in a “good” state of nature 
and transfers to the VC investor in a “bad” state of nature. Id. at 322. Importantly, as compared to 
the unilateral allocation of control power to either the entrepreneur or the investor, this allocation 
of power prevents the entrepreneur from seeking to continue a business when exit is optimal, while 
also avoiding an investor moving too quickly to abandon a business. Id. at 318. 
54. Bartlett, supra note 50, at 53–54 (“A VC investor . . . [will] negotiat[e] control and 
monitoring rights that are disproportionate to its stock ownership.”). 
55. Id. at 54 (“[A] VC investor will commonly have veto rights over the issuance of securities, 
asset sales, mergers, or other important corporate transactions.”). 
56. See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 967, 988–89 (2006) (focusing on the appointment of directors by venture 
capitalists); Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real 
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is traceable to an identified corporate constituency. In the VC context, 
constituency directors typically represent the VC investors.57 Although the 
fiduciary duty implications of constituency directors are debated in the 
literature,58 their appointment is designed to facilitate joint decision-making 
by allowing investors to engage in a deliberative process with the 
entrepreneur.59 
While scholars have attempted to shoehorn these arrangements into the 
traditional confrontational paradigm, many features of VC contracting are 
inconsistent with the traditional agency-cost model.60 As observed by Gordon 
Smith, the relationship between the VC investors and the entrepreneur 
involves “a more complex interaction characterized by give-and-take on both 
sides.”61 In a pure agency relationship, the principal’s only obligation is 
providing pecuniary compensation for the agent’s services. Venture 
capitalists tend to provide more than that. They provide a whole series of 
“value-added services,” such as “identifying and evaluating business 
opportunities, including management, entry, or growth strategies; negotiating 
and closing the investment; tracking and coaching the company; providing 
technical and management assistance; and attracting additional capital, 
directors, management, suppliers, and other key stakeholders and 
resources.”62 Because of these added services, the success of a start-up is as 
likely to depend on the business expertise of sophisticated VC investors as 
on the entrepreneur’s human capital. 
VC contracting recognizes the value of the contributions by both the 
entrepreneur-insider and the VC investors by adopting a model of shared 
decision-making. A collaborative governance model is better situated than a 
confrontational one to promote conditions that facilitate the development and 
aggregation of the valuable firm-specific information of both the 
entrepreneur and the investors. As we shall see next, the changes that have 
occurred in corporate production and the role of shareholders have 
increasingly blurred the line between the VC context and the public-
 
World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 308–10 
(2003) (empirically analyzing board composition in VC contracts); see also Brian J. Broughman, 
The Role of Independent Directors in Startup Firms, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 461, 462 (discussing the 
use of third-party independent directors in start-up firms). 
57. Fried & Ganor, supra note 56, at 988 (observing that the link between a constituency 
director and the VC investors may be more or less explicit). 
58. See Simone M. Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of Constituency Directors, 91 
WASH. U. L. REV. 309, 342–50 (2013) (discussing the relevant case law). 
59. See id. at 335–37, 340–41 (arguing that constituency directors offer a way to complete the 
necessary incomplete contracts of venture capitalists and other investors). 
60. See Bartlett, supra note 50, at 57–58 (identifying features of VC contracting that cannot be 
explained in terms of agency costs). 
61. Smith, supra note 47, at 139. 
62. Id. at 134 (quoting WILLIAM D. BYGRAVE & JEFFRY A. TIMMONS, VENTURE CAPITAL AT 
THE CROSSROADS 13 (1992)). 
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corporation context, with the result that many public corporations are also 
moving from a confrontational model to a collaborative one. 
B. The Extension of Collaboration to the Public Corporation 
Insider–shareholder collaboration has spread from the VC context to 
publicly traded firms. Three factors explain this development. First, public 
firms have become more dependent on the information-intensive 
environment that has traditionally been the province of start-ups. Second, the 
shareholder base of public companies is now dominated by large institutional 
shareholders who are devoting growing sophistication and resources to 
understanding and engaging with their portfolio companies. As a result, these 
investors offer firms new sources of information. Third, the modern public-
company board consists, almost entirely, of independent directors, creating 
an information challenge for unilateral board decision-making. 
1. Partial Information Problem and the Public Corporation.—
Corporate production has undergone a vast transformation in the last thirty to 
forty years.63 In the industrial age, corporations derived most of their value 
from physical assets and manufacturing activities. In the twenty-first-century 
corporation, instead, firm value increasingly depends on intangible assets, 
such as technological know-how, patents, research-and-development 
projects, brand names, and trade secrets.64 Along the same lines, human 
capital has also become a specialized resource.65 Successful corporations 
today are defined by their ability to access, transfer, and assemble specific 
knowledge. While one may think of the shift to intangible “knowledge” 
assets as a process that only affects new economy companies, such as Google, 
Facebook, Apple, and Tesla, in reality, information increasingly is the key 
 
63. See Carol A. Corrado & Charles R. Hulten, How Do You Measure a “Technological 
Revolution”?, 100 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 99, 100 (2010) (“[T]he recent technological 
revolution, in its various manifestations, is associated with a dramatic shift in the composition of 
investment spending and in the factors driving the growth of output per worker hour.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
64. As explained by Carol Corrado and Charles Hulten: 
[T]he innovation that has shaped recent economic growth is not an autonomous event 
that falls like manna from heaven. Nor is it a result of R&D and ICT investments alone. 
Instead, a surge of new ideas (technological or otherwise) is linked to output growth 
through a complex process of investments in technological expertise, product design, 
market development, and organizational capability. This process affects all sources of 
growth to one extent or another but is most clearly detected in the growing contribution 
of intangible capital. 
Id. at 103. 
65. See, e.g., Alex Edmans, Does the Stock Market Fully Value Intangibles? Employee 
Satisfaction and Equity Prices, 101 J. FIN. ECON. 621, 622, 627–29 (2011) (“I find a strong, robust, 
positive correlation between [employee] satisfaction and shareholder returns. This result provides 
empirical support for recent theories of the firm focused on employees as the key assets . . . .” 
(citations omitted)); Luigi Zingales, In Search of New Foundations, 55 J. FIN. 1623, 1641–42 (2000) 
(emphasizing the importance of human capital over physical capital in today’s corporations). 
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driver to success across industries.66 Moreover, generating and exploiting 
knowledge demands that knowledge be continually replenished. 
As a result, the informational structure of the public corporation has 
become more complex than reflected in the traditional models of the 
corporation. Under those models, information issues only mattered in 
connection to moral hazard and other agency costs, in the form of an 
asymmetric information problem between insiders and investors. The 
normative task was then to determine the appropriate balance of shareholder 
and insider power to limit managerial moral hazard without sacrificing 
efficient operational decision-making. A presumption about the 
confrontational nature of the insider–shareholder relationship logically 
followed. 
In today’s knowledge-rich economy, however, asymmetric information 
issues only partially capture the relevance of information for the theory of the 
firm. Indeed, in this economy, “partial information” problems are likely to 
matter as much as, if not more than, asymmetric information problems for 
firm value. As economist Harold Demsetz observed, although information 
has obvious connections to moral hazard and agency costs, information costs 
play a bigger role in the theory of the firm.67 Changes in corporate production 
and the role of shareholders have increased this role. Successful corporations 
are defined today by the ability to bring together the vast quantities of 
information necessary for the production of “‘knowledge’ assets”68—ideas 
linked to “investments in technological expertise, product design, market 
development, and organizational capability.”69 In this environment, 
Demsetz’s remark that “[e]conomic organization, including the firm, must 
reflect the fact that knowledge is costly to produce, maintain, and use”70 has 
never been more to the point. 
 
66. See Colin Mayer, Reinventing the Corporation, 4 J. BRIT. ACAD. 53, 54 (2016) (stating that 
80% of the market value of U.S. corporations is nowadays represented by intangible assets). 
67. Harold Demsetz, The Theory of the Firm Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 141, 141 (1988). 
Studies on the issue of the production, aggregation, and dissemination of information within 
organizations date back to the pioneering work of Simon, Polanyi, and von Mises. See MICHAEL 
POLANYI, PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE 69–71 (Harper Torchbook ed., Harper & Row 1964) (1958) 
(discussing the concept of tacit or personal knowledge—things that we may know but find 
impossible to completely and effectively communicate to others); HERBERT A. SIMON, 
ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 72–73 (3d ed. 1976) (focusing on the issue of the difficulties and costs 
associated with transferring information within firms and in markets); LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN 
ACTION 648–50 (1949) (discussing the period of time between changes in market data and the point 
where the market is adjusted); see also Utset, supra note 52, at 73–76 (providing an overview of the 
relevant literature). Over time, however, the study of informational issues in corporate governance 
has lost its initial general relevance and become limited to matters connected with agency costs. 
68. BIG INNOVATION CTR., THE PURPOSEFUL COMPANY: INTERIM REPORT 5 (2016), 
http://www.biginnovationcentre-purposeful-company.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ 
thepurposefulcompany_interimreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK3D-LBNG]. 
69. Corrado & Hulten, supra note 63, at 103. 
70. Demsetz, supra note 67, at 157. 
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Partial information problems have now transferred to the public 
corporation because the modern corporation’s operational complexity makes 
it highly unlikely that any single individual or organization will possess the 
relevant information “to respond effectively to all business challenges.”71 
Rather, information tends to be scattered through a multitude of agents, 
requiring corporate actors to leverage and pull knowledge from multiple 
sources. Adding to this informational complexity, the rise of sophisticated 
and actively informed investors suggests that these investors are increasingly 
likely to have the capacity to gather relevant knowledge—knowledge that 
board members may not necessarily share. 
Under these different informational assumptions, the normative 
necessity of a confrontational corporate paradigm disappears. The task is no 
longer only to determine the appropriate balance of shareholder and manager 
power to limit managerial moral hazard but also to determine the best way to 
aggregate the partial information of corporate insiders and shareholders. The 
increased use of collaborative schemes that we observe in public corporations 
suggests that these schemes can pursue this task better than traditional 
competitive schemes. 
2. Empowered and Informed Investors.—Capital market developments 
make it increasingly rational to look to public-company shareholders as 
sources of valuable information. Modern shareholders no longer fit Berle and 
Means’s account.72 They have instead become empowered, largely because 
of the reconcentration of equity ownership,73 which has increased since the 
1990s.74 Institutional investors now own over two-thirds of the outstanding 
shares of the thousand largest U.S. public companies.75 These investors vary 
in their characteristics—ranging from passive mutual funds that select stocks 
according to a broad market index to hedge funds whose business model is 
predicated on identifying companies that they believe underperform industry 
peers and forcing changes from the inside that can improve corporate 
performance. In spite of these differences, however, institutional investors of 
all types have grown increasingly informed as well as increasingly engaged 
in their portfolio companies. 
Similar to VC investors, today’s institutional investors bring their 
knowledge of the market rather than just capital to firms. Hedge funds 
specialize in developing firm-specific information that they then deploy by 
 
71. BIG INNOVATION CTR., supra note 68, at 6 (emphasis added). 
72. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: Activist 
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 867 (2013). 
73. Other crucial changes occurred in the marketplace including the emergence of proxy 
advisory firms, the adoption of universal majority voting, and accompanying withhold campaigns. 
Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEXAS L. REV. 987, 995, 1010–11 (2010). 
74. Id. at 996. 
75. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 72, at 865. 
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providing governance and strategic inputs to the firms they target.76 In 
selecting targets and devising future investment strategies, the funds employ 
teams of dedicated analysts who pore over financial documents, engage with 
both the company’s existing investors and competitors, and often visit 
potential targets to gather as much information as possible.77 Hedge funds 
also tend to specialize in certain industries or sectors of an industry, around 
which they build a strong expertise and develop network contacts.78 
Large institutional investors such as mutual funds are also increasingly 
engaged in information production and no longer just as “reticent” supporters 
of initiatives undertaken by activist hedge funds.79 Asset managers like 
BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street¾whose combined holdings make 
them the largest shareholder in 40% of all U.S. listed companies80¾have 
both the resources and the incentives to develop governance sophistication 
and expertise.81 Many large institutional investors also have in-house teams 
that are dedicated to gathering governance information and investment 
insights and formulating policies ranging from board composition to risk 
management.82 
Collectively, these developments stand in sharp contrast to the 
traditional management-power claim that because shareholders are poorly 
informed they should play a limited role in corporate decision-making. At the 
same time, the developing skills and inputs of today’s shareholders extend 
far beyond the shareholder-power claim for increased monitoring. 
Shareholders also provide crucial informational inputs, inputs that, as we 
shall see next, the modern independent board may be unable to provide. 
3. Independent Directors and Information Access.—The final 
development that explains the extension of collaboration to the modern 
public company is the rise of the independent board. The percentage of 
independent directors on corporate boards has steadily increased since the 
 
76. Id. at 897. 
77. OWEN WALKER, BARBARIANS IN THE BOARDROOM 31 (2016). 
78. See id. at 11–21 (discussing the different business models of major hedge fund players). 
79. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 72, at 867 (describing institutional investors as “rationally 
reticent”). 
80. If we restrict the field to the largest 500 American corporations, share ownership by the 
“Big Three” (i.e., BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street) amounts to an astonishing 88%. Fichtner 
et al., supra note 10, at 313. The rise of the Big Three is explained by the massive shift from active 
toward passive investment strategies, which began after the financial crisis. Id. at 302–03. Unlike 
active funds, passive “index” funds replicate existing stock indices by buying shares of the member 
firms of a particular index. BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street largely dominate the passive 
index fund industry, collectively managing over 90% of all assets under management in passive 
equity funds. Id. at 299, 304. 
81. Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street: 
A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 17, 49 (2019). 
82. See id. at 25 (describing increased engagement of the Big Three with portfolio companies). 
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aftermath of the takeover era83 as a result of various mechanisms that have 
transformed the independent or “monitoring” board into a virtually 
mandatory element of the law.84 Most U.S. boards now consist largely of 
outsiders with full-time jobs elsewhere who can devote only limited time to 
the running of the business for which they act as directors.85 The outpouring 
of new regulation resulting from the financial crises of the last decade also 
claims a significant portion of that time, limiting the time that independent 
directors can spend on information gathering and business decision-
making.86 
In addition, the standards for independence have become increasingly 
stringent, so much so that, according to some commentators, they “rule[] out 
just about anybody who has firsthand knowledge of the company and its 
industry.”87 The emphasis placed on independence requirements can indeed 
have the effect of sacrificing expertise by disqualifying directors based on 
their firm or industry ties.88 The result is that many independent directors lack 
the firm-specific human capital, knowledge, and skills of executive directors 
and tend instead to be “generalists.”89 In the best-case scenario, independent 
directors develop firm-specific expertise over a lengthy process.90 In the 
worst-case scenario, they never “develop . . . more than a rudimentary 
understanding of their companies’ workings.”91 
The extent to which these developments limit the information available 
to modern public-company boards is unclear.92 At a minimum, however, 
increased director independence suggests that while a board of directors is 
likely to continue to retain access to unique inside information, it seems 
factually obsolete to assume that the board cannot benefit from the different 
information that today’s empowered shareholders may bring to the corporate 
decision-making process. 
 
83. See Gordon, supra note 27, at 1475 (noting that between 1950 and 2005, the percentage of 
independent directors increased from approximately 20% to 75%). 
84. Among others, these mechanisms include stock-exchange listing standards mandating 
director independence, Delaware courts’ requirements, and pressure from corporate governance 
reformers¾first “as part of the post-hostile bid settlement among institutional investors, managers, 
and boards” of the 1990s and then in the aftermath of the corporate scandals of the early 2000s. Id. 
at 1468, 1477. 
85. Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate 
Boards, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1064–65 (2014). 
86. Id. 
87. COLIN B. CARTER & JAY W. LORSCH, BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD 45 (2004). 
88. Cf. Yaron Nili, Horizontal Directors, 114 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript 
at 2–3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3438281 [https://perma.cc/EBG6-
RDU9] (arguing that current and former directorships in the same industry may have 
anticompetitive effects). 
89. Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 85, at 1066. 
90. CARTER & LORSCH, supra note 87, at 45. 
91. Id. 
92. See Bainbridge & Henderson, supra note 85, at 1065–66 (noting the various reasons for 
information asymmetry between independent directors and inside managers). 
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C. A Taxonomy of Shareholder Collaboration 
Both large institutional investors (such as mutual funds and pension 
funds) and hedge funds increasingly engage in collaboration with corporate 
insiders. Conceptually, however, collaboration differs between these two 
investor groups. Hedge funds tend to engage in firm-specific operational 
collaboration through the proposal of business-strategy initiatives and often 
appoint one or more activist directors to supervise the implementation of 
those initiatives. Large institutional investors collaborate in ways that scale 
across multiple companies and broad themes, including takeover defenses, 
executive compensation structures, public policy issues, and regulatory 
matters. 
Further, the spectrum of shareholder collaboration presents significant 
variation. Collaboration can take place both within and outside the 
institutional structure of the corporation, have an explicit or implicit 
contractual nature, and be advisory or binding. Collaboration thus emerges 
as a “continuous,” rather than a “binary” choice.93 This subpart examines the 
spectrum of shareholder collaboration and highlights some recent examples. 
1. Hedge Funds and Constructivist Activism.—Activist hedge funds are 
usually portrayed as the prototypical corporate adversaries who seek to wrest 
board control, replace existing management, and engineer a structural or 
operational change. Yet hostile campaigns are not the exclusive form of 
hedge fund activism. Instead, the structure of these campaigns varies, 
sometimes substantially, depending on the fund’s specific business model 
and temperament of its managers; the target’s response; whether the fund 
seeks the replacement of the entire board or, more typically, only a partial 
slate; and whether it can count on the support of the company’s institutional 
investors.94 In particular, hedge funds are increasingly embracing a more 
“constructivist,” longer-term kind of activism.95 
A constructivist activist, as put by Leo Strine: 
may need to knock a bit loudly, but once let in, assumes the duties and 
economic consequences of becoming a genuine fiduciary with duties 
to other stockholders and of holding its position for a period of five to 
ten years, during which it is a constructive participant in helping the 
rest of the board and management improve a lagging company.96 
 
93. A binary choice is one where the alternatives are yes or no, acceptance or rejection. A 
continuous choice, instead, is one between a set of differently preferred alternatives. See, e.g., 
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 213–14 (1978) (providing 
examples of common binary-choice problems). 
94. See WALKER, supra note 77, at 30–37 (describing the typical structure of activist 
campaigns). 
95. See id. at 13–17 (describing strategies of Nelson Peltz, Ralph Whitworth, and Jeffrey 
Ubben, all of whom practice a collaborative form of activism). 
96. Strine, supra note 42, at 1908. 
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Constructivist activism is best understood as shareholder collaboration. 
A constructivist hedge fund combines industry knowledge with a deep dive 
into firm-specific information, researching its target and developing a 
strategic agenda. The hedge fund typically incorporates this research into a 
detailed presentation or white paper that communicates the hedge fund’s 
information both to the board and to other shareholders.97 Whether through a 
short-slate-election contest or, more commonly, a settlement agreement, the 
hedge fund obtains board representation and uses that representation to work 
within the existing board to oversee the incorporation of its information into 
operational decisions for the purpose of improving firm performance.98 
Viewed through this lens, the rise of settlement agreements granting the 
activist negotiated board representation is an important component of the 
shift from confrontation to collaboration.99 The number of activist 
representatives serving as directors continues to grow—activists obtained 
616 board seats since 2013.100 Only a small percentage of these directors 
obtained their positions through full election contests; most activist 
representatives obtained board seats through a negotiation with the issuer 
outside the proxy-contest process.101 Activists obtained more board seats in 
the first quarter of 2018 than all of 2017.102 Moreover, more than 85% of the 
seats in Q1 2018 were obtained by settlement rather than through a proxy 
fight.103 
 
97. See, e.g., Hedge Funds, SAVVY INVESTOR, https://www.savvyinvestor.net/alternative-
asset-classes/hedge-funds/articles-and-white-papers [https://perma.cc/2FDP-PAAL] (featuring a 
collection of white papers). 
98. See, e.g., M&A TEAM, J.P. MORGAN, THE 2017 PROXY SEASON: GLOBALIZATION AND A 
NEW NORMAL FOR SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 10–12 (2017) (documenting the growth of activist 
campaigns focused on cost-cutting and strategic direction, as opposed to M&A objectives). 
99. See WALKER, supra note 77, at 36 (reporting that 45.5% of U.S. activist campaigns ended 
in a “truce” between 2010 and 2015); Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Dancing with the Activists 4 
(European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 604, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2948869 [https://perma.cc/MZX8-SG32] (documenting evidence of a 
sevenfold increase in settlement agreements between 2000 and 2013); John C. Coffee, Jr., The 
Agency Cost of Activism: Information Leakage, Thwarted Majorities, and the Public Morality 9 
(European Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 373, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3058319 [https://perma.cc/Z4PY-52AZ] 
(reporting data from Lazard that 95% of the record 131 board seats obtained by activist hedge funds 
in 2016 were the result of a settlement agreement). 
100. LAZARD, REVIEW OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM - 1Q 2018, at 5 (2018), https:// 
www.lazard.com/media/450557/lazard-1q-2018-activism-review.pdf [https://perma.cc/BW9C-
DLDA]. 
101. LAZARD, 2017 ACTIVISM YEAR IN REVIEW 5 (2018), https://www.lazard.com/media/ 
450414/lazards-review-of-shareholder-activism-q4-2017pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/H6KT-54GS] 
(reporting that 64% of board seats won by activists in 2017 occurred outside the proxy process). 
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These settlements between activists and issuers have a number of 
features.104 They typically include a standstill agreement in which the activist 
agrees not to engage in hostile activity as well as to adhere to additional 
restrictions.105 They often contemplate a long-term engagement between 
incumbent directors and activist nominees.106 Although board representation 
may still simply be a means to exploring a sale or other structural changes, 
many activist directors are retaining their board seats for multiple years107 
and focusing their attention on business strategy and other operational 
issues.108 In similar circumstances, settlement agreements are likely to 
promote an environment in which activist-appointed directors—similar to 
constituency directors in the VC context—work alongside incumbents as 
colleagues to effect changes in a collaborative rather than confrontational 
manner.109 
Further, while constructivist activists have traditionally represented the 
minority numerically (relative to hit-and-run, hostile activists), both the 
empirical and anecdotal evidence point to substantial growth in this form of 
activism.110 Commentators now suggest that collaborative engagement could 
dominate hostile engagement in the future.111 In an article published in 
 
104. See generally Francis J. Aquila, Negotiating a Settlement with an Activist Investor, PRAC. 
L.J.: TRANSACTIONS & BUS., Apr. 2015, at 22, https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/Apr15 
_InTheBoardroom.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TJU-2PQQ] (describing common provisions in 
settlement agreements with activist investors). 
105. See, e.g., Derek D. Bork, Settlement Agreements with Activist Investors—the Latest 
Entrenchment Device?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 7, 2016), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/07/07/settlement-agreements-with-activist-investors-the-
latest-entrenchment-device/ [https://perma.cc/MW4G-4ZVZ] (describing common restrictions 
imposed by settlement agreements on activists in connection with negotiated board representation). 
106. For example, some companies require activist-appointed directors to “sign and pre-deliver 
director resignations that are automatically triggered when the board decides that the representative 
has breached the settlement agreement.” Id. 
107. See, e.g., Ian D. Gow, Sa-Pyung Sean Shin & Suraj Srinivasan, Activist Directors: 
Determinants and Consequences 13 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-120, 2014), 
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/14-120_451759fe-d298-4072-81d1-
b007fd4d5bc0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3J5P-FPZL] (reporting average tenure, as of 2013, of two years 
for activist directors who had left the board and nearly four years for directors who are still on the 
board). 
108. See also Ethan A. Klingsberg & Elizabeth Bieber, Activism in 2018, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 29, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/29/ 
activism-in-2018/ [https://perma.cc/G74V-5B5V] (observing that “[t]he activists are now regularly 
holding investments for four to five years and focusing more consistently during the initial years of 
their investments on advocating for operational turnarounds”). 
109. Ira Millstein makes a convincing case for constructive activism in his recent book. See 
generally IRA MILLSTEIN, THE ACTIVIST DIRECTOR (2017). 
110. See C.N.V. Krishnan et al., The Second Wave of Hedge Fund Activism: The Importance of 
Reputation, Clout, and Expertise, 40 J. CORP. FIN. 296, 310–11 (2016) (providing empirical 
evidence that the most successful activists have been capable of taking large stakes, gaining board 
seats, and staying in a corporation for longer periods of time); Shill, supra note 8, at 1254, 1262–63 
(describing a “dynamic of boards and activists . . . edging unmistakably towards collaboration” and 
providing anecdotal evidence supporting this conclusion). 
111. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 77, at 230. 
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February 2018, the Financial Times spoke of a new class of “sons of 
activists,” which includes several former portfolio managers of more 
established, hostile hedge funds.112 This new generation of activists is 
“eschewing the public dispute and open confrontation” of the older guard and 
is instead “eager to work with management behind the scenes and to hold 
positions for longer.”113 
ValueAct’s involvement with Microsoft offers a high-profile example 
of constructivist activism.114 In 2013, ValueAct researched Microsoft for 
months, concluding that the company suffered from a “perception 
problem.”115 Most investors believed that the company’s profits came largely 
from the sale of operating systems and personal computers.116 The declining 
PC market thus suggested that Microsoft’s prospects were not good.117 
ValueAct instead believed the company’s strength lay in other services, such 
as the company’s Office suite of products and Outlook email system.118 
After some behind-the-scenes contacts, the parties signed a standstill 
agreement, under which ValueAct obtained a board seat in exchange for 
desisting from a potential proxy fight¾de facto choosing a collaborative 
scheme over a competitive one.119 Following the signing of the standstill 
agreement, Microsoft implemented several of the suggestions made by 
ValueAct (including the appointment of a new CEO).120 Meanwhile, the 
share price of Microsoft rose considerably.121 
Commenting on the success of the venture, ValueAct’s Morfit Mason 
remarked that Microsoft is not the usual hedge fund story of: 
battles, victors, and losers . . . . It’s actually about re-examining all of 
the premises on which a 40-year-old icon was built and discarding the 
ones that don’t make sense in this world and driving toward the ones 
that do. You can trace all of the actions that have happened at 
Microsoft to that fundamental attitude. Not necessarily to us, but 
Microsoft re-examining all of its fundamental beliefs.122 
ValueAct’s investment in Microsoft was a long-term one. Mason sat on 
the Microsoft board, and ValueAct held a substantial quantity of Microsoft 
 




114. See WALKER, supra note 77, at 145–55. 




119. Id. at 150–51. 
120. Id. at 153–54. 
121. Id. at 155. 
122. Id. (quoting Mason). 
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stock through 2017.123 During this time, Microsoft’s stock price continued to 
increase. 
The 94-page white paper released by Nelson Peltz’s Trian Fund—
another fund with a well-established reputation for constructivist activism—
in the recent engagement at Procter & Gamble (P&G)124 provides another 
salient example. Trian’s white paper made it clear that the fund was seeking 
to add Peltz to the P&G board in order to create “sustainable long-term value 
at P&G”125 and not seeking to replace P&G’s CEO or any other “classic” 
disciplinary outcomes sought by hostile activists.126 At least on paper, Trian 
was seeking a collaborative rather than a competitive interaction with the 
P&G board, one designed to add knowledge rather than to have the board 
fired.127 Concededly, the P&G board strongly opposed Trian’s intervention, 
which led to one of the most expensive proxy contests in history.128 In the 
end, however, P&G shareholders narrowly supported Peltz’s candidacy.129 It 
is also noteworthy that even after P&G conceded defeat, Peltz continued to 
profess his intention not to disrupt the board’s operations but to “work[] 
collaboratively with [P&G’s CEO] and the rest of the board to drive 
sustainable long-term shareholder value.”130 
Trian’s recent intervention in another classic American brand, General 
Electric Company (GE), presents even clearer collaborative features. This 
time, the company itself initiated the collaboration; GE’s CEO invited Trian 
to invest in the company and become active in reforming it.131 That Trian had 
 
123. See ValueAct Capital Reduces Microsoft Stake, MARKET FOLLY (Aug. 9, 2017), 
http://www.marketfolly.com/2017/08/valueact-capital-reduces-microsoft-stake.html [https:// 
perma.cc/U7NS-25BA] (reporting ValueAct’s  sale of seven million Microsoft shares in 2017). 
124. TRIAN PARTNERS, REVITALIZE P&G TOGETHER, VOTE THE WHITE PROXY CARD (2017), 
http://www.wlrk.com/docs/Trian-PG-White-Paper-9_6_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/RN6S-C6T6]. 
125. Id. at 4. 
126. Martin Lipton, The Trian/P&G Proxy Contest, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
& FIN. REG. (Sept. 11, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/09/11/the-trianpg-proxy-
contest/ [https://perma.cc/F9EB-HRXL]. 
127. See, e.g., Shawn Tully, Three Reasons Why P&G Should Put Nelson Peltz on Its Board, 
FORTUNE (Oct. 4, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/10/04/pg-trian-proxy-battle/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4386-SENA] (arguing that shareholders should support Peltz because of weaknesses in P&G’s 
operational strategy that might be remedied by “a consumer goods veteran who’s betting billions 
that new thinking can revive a flagging American icon”). 
128. Chris Isidore & David Goldman, Procter & Gamble Declares Victory in Expensive Proxy 
Fight, CNN MONEY (Oct. 10, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/10/10/news/companies/procter-
gamble-proxy-fight/index.html [https://perma.cc/M7W2-RD47] (describing the contest as “the 
most expensive in U.S. corporate history”). 
129. See Nick Turner & Beth Jinks, P&G Names Activist Nelson Peltz to Board After Proxy 
Battle (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-15/p-g-names-
billionaire-nelson-peltz-to-board-after-proxy-battle [https://perma.cc/4SPR-WD9P] (reporting that 
Peltz won by fewer than 43,000 shares). 
130. Id. 
131. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Why Nelson Peltz Wants P&G to See Him as a ‘Constructivist,’ N.Y. 
TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/17/business/dealbook/ 
nelson-peltzs-play-for-pampg-honorable-intentions.html [https://perma.cc/ACZ7-YE7Z]. 
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knowledge unavailable to GE was implicit in that request. At the same time, 
as noted by one commentator, the request would arguably not have 
materialized if Trian had not developed a reputation “for working behind the 
scenes with management to improve performance . . . [and sticking] around, 
often for years, as transformations occur.”132 
On the front of the new generation of the “sons of activists,” up-and-
coming D.E. Shaw & Co. made news in early 2018 for gaining three board 
seats at Lowe’s, the giant home-improvement chain.133 The appointment of 
D.E. Shaw’s activist directors took place after a settlement that Lowe’s 
management described as involving “constructive discussions” with the 
fund.134 Significantly, the entire campaign was kept private until the 
settlement.135 According to industry watchers, this circumstance underlines 
the change in the approach of the new generation of activists, which are “not 
just less confrontational in public, but also easier to work with behind the 
scenes.”136 Whereas the older guard would pressure or even intimidate 
incumbents into effecting desired changes, the new guard is not “going to try 
to intimidate anyone.”137 Instead, they are trying to collaborate with insiders. 
Lastly, activist hedge fund Elliott Management, a fund commonly 
associated with confrontation, recently disclosed that it has been engaged for 
months in talks with the management of SAP SE, in which Elliott has a $1.4 
billion stake.138 According to SAP management, the two are working on “new 
initiatives to accelerate operational excellence and value creation.”139 
2. Mutual and Pension Fund Engagement.—A substantial proportion of 
large institutional investors such as mutual funds and pension funds are 
committed investors in the sense that they do not or cannot readily sell their 
stock if they disagree with managers’ operational decisions.140 This 
commitment creates both an incentive for them to invest in generating firm-
specific information and an assurance to managers that the concerns that the 
investors bring to the dialogue are not the product of short-term strategies.141 
 
132. Geoffrey Smith, GE Just Caved and Put One of Nelson Peltz’s Colleagues on Its Board, 
FORTUNE (Oct. 10, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/10/10/ge-just-caved-and-put-one-of-nelson-
peltzs-colleagues-on-its-board/ [https://perma.cc/6JQV-D4EB]. 





138. Eyk Henning, SAP and Elliott Have Held Strategy Talks for Months, BLOOMBERG 
(Apr. 24, 2019, 5:05 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-24/sap-elliott-are-
said-to-have-held-strategy-talks-for-months [https://perma.cc/KJD7-FCFU]. 
139. Id. 
140. See Fisch et al., supra note 81, at 56–57 (explaining that so-called passive investors cannot 
exit by selling their stock). 
141. See id. at 52 (observing that passive investors do not benefit from strategies that generate 
short-term gains at the expense of long-term value). 
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Collaboration between large institutional investors and corporate 
insiders, however, differs from hedge fund collaboration in both form and 
substance. Institutional investors do not typically seek board 
representation.142 Nor do they engage in the level of detailed research and 
firm-specific analysis that characterizes hedge fund campaigns.143 Instead, 
large institutions collaborate through various forms of “engagement,”144 
which operationalizes a dialogical process145 about matters of concern.146 In 
particular, engagement tends to focus on market-wide or industry-wide issues 
such as governance, sustainability, and risk management,147 as the size of 
institutional investors places them in a unique position to enjoy economies of 
scale and observe trends across the companies in their portfolio that may 
supplement the perspective of firm insiders. 
Engagement by institutional investors often results in changes at the 
involved companies, although these changes are the product of a consensus 
process between corporate insiders and institutional investors. For example, 
in a recent survey on the top successful engagement outcomes, shareholders 
listed the promotion of additional company disclosures, the adoption of 
specific changes in company policies or business practices, and the 
company’s commitment to act on issues of concerns in the future.148 
 
142. At least one corporation, UnitedHealth Group, has established an advisory committee to 
allow shareholders to suggest new directors. Dangerous Talk? When/How Should Directors 
Communicate with Shareholders?, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP (Latham & Watkins LLP, San Diego, 
Cal.), at 2, https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/read/52351925/1-dangerous-talk-when-how-
should-directors-communicate-with- [https://perma.cc/QA44-PSW6]. John Coffee has proposed 
that a steering committee of institutional investors in charge of assembling a team of outside 
directors in case of an activist attack could provide an effective solution to the problems raised by 
hedge-fund-appointed directors. Coffee, supra note 99, at 26. 
143. See, e.g., SHARON E. FAY, ALL. BERNSTEIN, THE MEGAPHONE EFFECT 3 (2018) 
https://www.alliancebernstein.com/sites/library/Instrumentation/FINAL_EQU-7697-0618.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2UQU-H5PL] (noting that “index funds are noticeably absent from engagement 
based on fundamental research”). 
144. For a detailed description of shareholder engagement, see Matthew J. Mallow & Jasmin 
Sethi, Engagement: The Missing Middle Approach in the Bebchuk-Strine Debate, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
BUS. 385, 392–94 (2016). 
145. The SEC has expressly indicated its support for increased communication between issuers 
and shareholders and offered “guidance on ways to enhance the ability of corporations to effectively 
and efficiently communicate with shareholders.” Lisa M. Fairfax, Mandating Board-Shareholder 
Engagement?, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 831 (2013). 
146. See F. William McNabb III, Getting to Know You: The Case for Significant Shareholder 
Engagement, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 24, 2015), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/24/getting-to-know-you-the-case-for-significant-
shareholder-engagement/ [https://perma.cc/M3BV-J4B6] (Vanguard CEO’s detailed description of 
the practicalities of engagement). 
147. PWC, DIRECTOR-SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 2 (2019), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/ 
governance-insights-center/publications/assets/pwc-director-shareholder-engagement-getting-it-
right.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4T2-CGFQ]. 
148. FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT AND PROXY ACCESS 15 (2016), 
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/events/2016/11/2016-ndi-executive-exchange 
[https://perma.cc/N2Q4-5T2P] (follow “Shareholder Engagement and Proxy Access” dropdown 
menu; then follow “Program Materials”). Do we really need these “indications”? 
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Engagement can take a wide range of forms, from private “one-on-one” 
meetings149 to periodic investor days,150 investor relations contacts,151 
industry conference presentations,152 a variety of online communication 
tools,153 as well as letters and phone calls.154 Several companies have also 
adopted “shareholder engagement policies,” which are designed to provide 
structured interaction guidelines for engagement—including on the 
frequency, methods, and topics of insider–shareholder interaction.155 Along 
similar lines, some boards have established “engagement committees,” 
which are permanently charged with managing the shareholder-engagement 
process.156 
Attesting to the mounting importance of shareholder engagement, a 
recent survey found that 63% of large institutional investors have engaged in 
direct discussions with management over the past five years, and 45% had 
private discussions with a company’s board outside of management 
presence.157 And while just 6% of S&P 500 companies reported investor 
 
149. Deloitte, Shareholder Engagement: A New Era in Corporate Governance, WALL ST. J.: 
RISK & COMPLIANCE J. (Oct. 1, 2013, 12:01 AM), https://deloitte.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/ 
2013/10/01/shareholder-engagement-a-new-era-in-corporate-governance/ 
[https://perma.cc/MTT8-679A]. 
150. Fairfax, supra note 146, at 831. 
151. Matteo Tonello, Global Trends in Board-Shareholder Engagement, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 25, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/10/25/ 
global-trends-in-board-shareholder-engagement/#more-53945 [https://perma.cc/X97R-HREK]. 
152. Id. 
153. Id.; see also What’s New in Shareholder Engagement: Telling Your Own Story, NASDAQ 
(June 22, 2017), https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/Material_Search.aspx?cid=130&mcd=CH 
[https://perma.cc/PTC7-SF2K] (describing shareholder engagement through online interactive 
proxy statements). 
154. Fisch et al., supra note 81, at 48 (reporting that “[i]n recent years . . . . [m]utual funds have 
increasingly made direct contact—by letter, phone, electronic communication, and direct 
meetings—with the officers and directors of their portfolio companies”). 
155. See, e.g., CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP, CONSIDERING A SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT 
POLICY––THE WHAT, WHY AND HOW 2–4 (2016), https://www.chapman.com/media/publication/ 
689_Chapman_Considering_Shareholder_Engagement_Policy_092916.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
P7DL-PMH2] (identifying “best practices” for implementation of a shareholder engagement 
policy). 
156. FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, supra note 148, at 9; see also Press Release, Tempur Sealy, 
Tempur Sealy Announces Leadership and Board Changes (May 11, 2015), http://investor 
.tempursealy.com/news-releases/news-release-details/tempur-sealy-announces-leadership-and-
board-changes [https://perma.cc/YLE3-CCM8] (announcing the creation of “a new Stockholder 
Liaison Committee, in order to create a Board-level structure for communication and engagement 
between the Board and stockholders and to enhance the existing stockholder communications 
process led by the Company’s management”); Letter from F. William McNabb III, Chairman & 
CEO, Vanguard, to Independent Leaders of the Boards of Directors of the Vanguard Fund’s Largest 
Portfolio Holdings (Feb. 27, 2015), https://pcg.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/09/7-CEO_Letter_03_02_ext.pdf [https://perma.cc/93SV-8RDZ] (explaining that 
“‘shareholder liaison committee[s]’ . . . can provide an appropriate structure for communicating 
with significant shareholders”). 
157. Joseph A. McCahery et al., Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of 
Institutional Investors, 71 J. FIN. 2905, 2906 (2016). 
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engagement in 2010, engagement figures rose to 72% as of June 2017.158 The 
numbers for BlackRock and Vanguard are especially telling. From mid-2014 
to mid-2015, BlackRock performed over 1,500 private “engagements” with 
companies held in their portfolio, and Vanguard had over 800 company 
engagements.159 
Besides engagement, examples of collaborative initiatives by 
institutional investors continue to emerge. On August 31, 2017, for instance, 
Vanguard released a letter to investors pushing for a two-way dialogue with 
corporations and reaffirming the importance of building “relationships with 
boards and management teams.”160 Only eight days later, on September 8, 
2017, Scott Stringer, the New York City Comptroller who manages the New 
York City Pension Funds, released a similar letter to the boards of 151 
companies requesting a meeting with these companies’ directors to discuss 
matters such as director criteria, diversity, and skillsets, and their linkage to 
the companies’ needs and risks.161 Similarly, in June 2018, T. Rowe Price 
issued a statement emphasizing that the firm’s “ability to generate unique 
insights about companies” reflected the additional “ability to cultivate 
constructive, private, two-way communication” with company management 
teams.162  
Further, engagement does not just occur at the individual company level. 
Both investors and issuers are participating in a growing number of private 
initiatives aimed at promoting insider–shareholder collaboration on a variety 
of issues and, in particular, corporate governance matters.163 One of the first 
such initiatives was the “Shareholder-Director Exchange Program” (SDX), a 
 
158. Mark Manoff & Stephen W. Klemash, 2017 Proxy Season Review, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 9, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/09/ 
2017-proxy-season-review/ [https://perma.cc/9TV4-5E74]. Among others, a company’s 
responsiveness to shareholder requests for engagement has also become one of the fundamental 
evaluation criteria used by the Institutional Shareholder Service (ISS) in recommending votes on a 
variety of governance topics, which might be one of the factors behind the increase in shareholder 
engagement. FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, supra note 148, at 5. 
159. Fichtner et al., supra note 80, at 318. 
160. Letter from F. William McNabb III, Chairman & CEO, Vanguard, to Directors of Public 
Companies Worldwide (Aug. 31, 2017), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/ 
governance-letter-to-companies.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9EE-33XP]. 
161. Press Release, N.Y.C. Comptroller, Comptroller Stringer, NYC Pension Funds Launch 




162. T. ROWE PRICE, T. ROWE PRICE’S INVESTMENT PHILOSOPHY ON SHAREHOLDER 
ACTIVISM 1 (2018), http://www.wlrk.com/docs/trowepriceesgspotlightjune2018.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/VKN5-4BCS]. 
163. Shareholders are also participating in coordinated engagements. See, e.g., Elroy Dimson, 
Oguzhan Karakas & Xi Li, Coordinated Engagements 2 (Dec. 24, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3209072 [https://perma.cc/WXB8-HRS8] 
(describing coordinated engagements by investors seeking to influence issuers on environmental 
and social issues). 
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private organization established in 2014 by representatives of major U.S. 
corporations and big institutional investors like BlackRock and Vanguard.164 
The SDX’s aim is promoting a voluntary template for healthy relations 
between shareholders and boards as well as regular and successful 
engagement on matters such as corporate governance, management changes, 
and long-term plans.165 Importantly, in defining successful engagement, the 
SDX’s protocol includes as essential “each party’s willingness to listen 
carefully to one another and to take action in response to valid concerns.”166 
That is, each party’s willingness to collaborate with the other is crucial within 
the SDX framework.167 
Along similar lines, in 2016, representatives of major U.S. corporations 
and major investors (including Blackrock, Vanguard, and ValueAct) signed 
a paper calling for new commonsense principles of corporate governance, 
principles that build on a constructive dialogue among the involved parties.168 
In 2017, a collective of U.S.-based institutional investors and global asset 
managers169 launched the “Investor Stewardship Group” (ISG), with the aim 
of improving cooperation among companies, large investors, and 
shareholders.170 The same year the International Business Council of the 
 
164. Linette Lopez, A New Group Has Declared War on the Carl Icahns of the World, BUS. 
INSIDER (Feb. 3, 2014, 9:13 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/shareholder-director-
exchange-2014-2 [https://perma.cc/9RX7-RVBF]; see also SDX, THE SHAREHOLDER-DIRECTOR 
EXCHANGE: INTRODUCTION AND PROTOCOL 1 (2014), http://www.sdxprotocol.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/04/SDX_Introduction-and-Protocol.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TFV-BHAE] (explaining 
the rationale for and setting forth a ten-point protocol offering issuers and shareholders guidance on 
when to engage and how to make those engagements valuable). 
165. David Gelles, Unlikely Allies Seek to Check Power of Activist Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES: 
DEALBOOK (Feb. 2, 2014, 10:01 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/02/unlikely-allies-
seek-to-check-power-of-activist-hedge-funds/ [https://perma.cc/KF9P-BNCG]. In the words of one 
SDX member, the SDX developed in the belief that “[s]hareholders and the boards that serve them 
need to be closer, they need to be more integrated, and there need to be real relationships.” Id. 
(quoting James C. Woolery, the chairman-elect of Cadwalader). 
166. Id. (quoting SDX protocol). 
167. Consistent with the increasingly proactive approach to engagement taken by both investors 
and corporations, the SDX meetings—as observed by a founding member—“have to have a 
purpose . . . . It isn’t just about everyone getting to know one another.” Id. (quoting Michelle Edkins 
of BlackRock). 
168. Open Letter: Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance, COMMONSENSE CORP. 
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, https://www.governanceprinciples.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/ 
2016-Open-Letter-Principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/EM2X-W6X6]. Among other governance 
matters, the commonsense principles cover the composition, election, compensation, and tenure of 
directors; the communication process between the board and the investors; shareholder rights; 
public reporting and management compensation; and succession planning. Id. 
169. Anne Meyer, Don Cassidy & Rajeev Kumar, The Investor Stewardship Group’s 
Governance Principles, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 11, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/11/the-investor-stewardship-groups-governance-
principles/ [https://perma.cc/F69Y-QVE2]. 
170. David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Common-Sense Capitalism, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 28, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/07/28/ 
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World Economic Forum approved “The New Paradigm,” a programmatic 
framework that “conceives of corporate governance as a collaboration among 
corporations, shareholders and other stakeholders,”171 with the expectation 
that institutional investors will “work to understand corporations’ strategies 
and operations and engage with them to provide corporations with 
opportunities to understand the investors’ opinions and to adjust strategies 
and operations in order to receive the investors’ support.”172 
Investors’ common ownership—the fact that many institutional 
investors own “significant stakes in multiple firms in the same industry”173 
—also enhances their incentives to collaborate with corporate insiders. 
Common ownership gives investors a comparative advantage relative to firm 
management in acquiring information that may be of value to several of their 
portfolio companies—such as information about macroeconomic trends, 
evolving legal risks, and developing market norms. Investors are increasingly 
choosing to use this advantage with, rather than against, management. An 
example is the recent efforts by several large institutional investors to work 
with their portfolio companies to promote increased attention to 
sustainability issues. Thus, last year, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street 
led efforts to induce Exxon management to devote greater attention to—as 
well as adopt greater disclosure and transparency about—the risks associated 
with climate change.174 
 
common-sense-capitalism/ [https://perma.cc/X2GK-GGJ3]; see also John C. Wilcox, The Investor 
Stewardship Group: An Inflection Point in U.S. Corporate Governance?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 30, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/30/ 
the-investor-stewardship-group-an-inflection-point-in-u-s-corporate-governance/ 
[https://perma.cc/4UUW-3RUQ] (noticing the overlap between the ISG member firms and 
signatories to the Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance). The ISG plans to achieve 
this goal by providing a “set of elementary corporate governance principles for U.S. listed 
companies . . . as well as parallel stewardship principles for U.S. institutional investors.” Meyer et 
al., supra 169. From this Article’s perspective, what is noteworthy about the ISG principles is that 
they endorse a “comply-or-explain” approach, which is intended to provide companies with the 
necessary flexibility to adopt tailored, collaborative solutions. Id. 
171. Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance: The New Paradigm, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 11, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/11/corporate-
governance-the-new-paradigm/ [https://perma.cc/3R9U-74BE]; see also WORLD ECON. FORUM, 
ANNUAL REPORT 2016 - 2017, at 44 (2017), http://www3.wefrum.org/docs/WEF 
_Annual_Report_2016_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2WU-KG3X]. 
172. Lipton, supra note 171. 
173. Asaf Eckstein, The Virtue of Common Ownership in an Era of Corporate Compliance, 
105 IOWA L. REV. 507, 509 (2020). 
174. See Steven Mufson, Financial Firms Lead Shareholder Rebellion Against ExxonMobil 
Climate Change Policies, WASH. POST (May 31, 2017, 3:30 PM), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/05/31/exxonmobil-is-trying-to-fend-off-a-shareholder-
rebellion-over-climate-change/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9160808b20a6 
[https://perma.cc/98A3-C34B] (citing an unnamed source as indicating that BlackRock, likely along 
with Vanguard and State Street, voted to support a shareholder proposal requesting management 
reporting about climate change). 
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Large institutional investors also have privileged access to legal and 
regulatory policy. As Asaf Eckstein documents, institutional investors are 
increasingly invited to comment on regulatory initiatives at a preproposal 
stage and to engage in a dialogue with policymakers.175 This access both 
enables investors to influence regulatory policies in ways that may benefit 
their portfolio companies and provides them early insights into potential 
regulatory changes that may require firms to adapt their operational policies. 
Finally, institutional investors serve a critical gatekeeping role with 
respect to hedge fund activism. It is well known that, because of their 
relatively small stakes, activists need the support of passive investors to be 
successful, support that in the past they have frequently been able to secure.176 
In recent years, however, institutional investors have taken a more nuanced 
view of activist interventions.177 On the one hand, they have increasingly 
withheld support of activists who primarily seek to force companies into 
share buybacks, extraordinary distributions, and other short-term “cut and 
run” strategies,178 which are incompatible with the longer investment horizon 
of institutional investors. On the other hand, institutional investors have 
remained willing to support activists that are committed to long-term value 
through collaboration.179 Further, institutional investors’ ability to function 
as the marginal voters in activist campaigns strengthens their effectiveness in 
ongoing engagement. Managers increasingly recognize that the support of 
institutional investors is a valuable defense to potentially hostile 
interventions and, as a result, have become more willing to engage with 
investors, build relationships, and respond to their concerns.180 
 
175. Eckstein, supra note 172, at 47–48. 
176. See Gilson & Gordon, supra note 72, at 866–67 (explaining that activists need the support 
of traditionally passive investors). 
177. See Simone M. Sepe, Board and Shareholder Power, Revisited, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1377, 
1440–41 (2017) (reporting that institutional investors have recently begun, in some cases, to support 
companies against activist interventions). 
178. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, BlackRock’s Chief, Laurence Fink, Urges Other C.E.O.s to Stop 
Being so Nice to Investors, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/04/14/business/dealbook/blackrocks-chief-laurence-fink-urges-other-ceos-to-stop-being-so-
nice-to-investors.html [https://perma.cc/L5H2-34NP] (discussing the concerns expressed by Larry 
Fink, the CEO of BlackRock, about short-termist hedge fund activism). 
179. As Larry Fink explained in BlackRock’s 2016 letter to CEOs, “activists who focus on 
long-term value creation sometimes do offer better strategies than management. In those cases, 
BlackRock’s corporate governance team will support activist plans.” Matt Turner, Here Is the Letter 
the World’s Largest Investor, BlackRock CEO Larry Fink, Just Sent to CEOs Everywhere, BUS. 
INSIDER (Feb. 2, 2016, 7:03 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/blackrock-ceo-larry-fink-letter-
to-sp-500-ceos-2016-2 [https://perma.cc/ZYX2-RDAX]. 
180. See, e.g., Peter Michelsen & Derek Zaba, The Rise of Investor-Centric Activism Defense 
Strategy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 25, 2017), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/10/25/the-rise-of-investor-centric-activism-defense-strategy/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q6JV-UWYX] (“[T]he right approach for companies is to ‘think like a 
shareholder representative’: engage with investors, understand and incorporate their perspectives, 
and educate them on why the company is pursuing a particular strategy, particularly before an 
activist appears.”). 
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III. Defending and Structuring the Collaborative Model 
Part II explained that the insider–shareholder dynamic in the public 
corporation is increasingly collaborative, rather than competitive, as argued 
by the defendants of the traditional models of the corporation. It also 
suggested that collaboration is a response to the informational changes that 
have occurred in corporate production and the role of shareholders, changes 
under which partial information problems have, for many firms, grown 
costlier than agency problems. 
In this Part, we use insights from both epistemic models of collective 
wisdom and the economics of information to defend the normative 
desirability of the collaborative model. We do this through the following 
steps. In subpart A, we explain that the partial information of investors and 
insiders is likely to be complementary, so that the informational whole 
resulting from the aggregation of insider and shareholder information is 
greater than the sum of its parts. In subpart B, we show that collaboration 
provides a mechanism for efficiently combining the partial and 
complementary information of insiders and shareholders, a mechanism that 
neither unilateral decision-making nor the mediated transmission of 
information through markets can provide. In subpart C, we offer an 
illustration to make the value-increasing properties of shareholder 
collaboration more tangible. Lastly, in subpart D, we discuss how the rules 
of the collaborative “game” should be designed to ensure that collaboration 
is compatible with the individual incentives of directors, managers, and 
shareholders. 
A. The Value of Collaboration 
1. Information Complementarity.—As we discussed above, the value of 
collaboration flows from the aggregation of the partial information that 
insiders and shareholders possess in a world of complex investments and 
reconcentrated equity ownership. We argue that the source of this added 
value stems from the fact that the partial information supplied by 
shareholders and insiders is likely to be “complementary” in nature. 
Information is complementary when the possession of one piece of 
information increases the marginal value of acquiring the second piece so 
that the informational whole is greater than the sum of its parts.181 
Complementary information is to be distinguished from substitute 
information. Information is substitute if the possession of one piece of 
information decreases the marginal value of acquiring another piece of 
information.182 In essence, information that is relatively similar tends to be 
 
181. Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 1422, 1467 (2011). 
182. Id. 
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substitute, as the second piece of information does not contribute much to the 
preexisting knowledge. 
Cognitive models help explain why corporate insiders and shareholders 
are likely to possess complementary rather than substitute information. These 
models distinguish between interpretative signals and the standard generated 
signals of statistical collective-wisdom models.183 “Generated” signals are 
the result of a random variable drawn from a distribution.184 For example, in 
the corporate context, observed sales of a new product send a generated signal 
about whether the product is of good quality. Generated signals, however, do 
not capture the fact that agents both receive signals and also interpret them, 
determining their meaning in light of other information, experience, and 
expertise. Thus, an agent might use its knowledge of the market, consumer 
needs, or past sales to determine whether the signal it receives from the sales 
of a new product is about customers’ reactions to the product’s quality or its 
price. Interpreting this signal correctly allows managers to make appropriate 
operational decisions about the future of the product. The role of 
interpretation may also induce firm decision-makers to search for a different 
kind of information than that provided by the sales of the product alone. 
Cognitive models of collective wisdom seek to capture this richer 
signaling structure through the concept of “interpreted” signals. Unlike 
generated signals, which are passively received by the agents, interpreted 
signals result from the agents’ “active cognitive effort.”185 That is, to create 
an interpreted signal, an agent uses an interpretative model that filters reality 
into a set of categories and then uses these categories to make predictions 
about the variable of interest.186 Under this richer cognitive structure, what 
matters for the ability of a collection of agents to produce more accurate 
predictions than a single agent in isolation are the characteristics of the 
agents’ interpretative models. 
 
183. Lu Hong & Scott Page, Interpreted and Generated Signals, 144 J. ECON. THEORY 2174, 
2175 (2009). 
184. More technically, Hong and Page explain generated signals as follows: 
For example, suppose the relevant issue concerns the status of a firm which can be 
classified as either “good” (G) or “bad” (B). Agents do not know the true status, but 
they have a common prior, say, P(G) = P(B) = ½. Each agent draws a binary signal, 
whose value is either g or b, from given distributions. Most often, these signals would 
be assumed to be drawn independently, i.e. their values would be independent 
conditional on the true status of the firm. 
Id. 
185. Id. 
186. More formally, cognitive models begin by defining predictive problems as involving a set 
of possible states of the world X and an outcome function F, which maps each possible state of the 
world into a given outcome. Each individual’s interpretation of the possible states of the world is 
then a partition of the set of states into distinct categories. Note that predictive models are coarser 
than the outcome function. Indeed, whereas the objective function maps states of the world into 
outcomes, predictive models map sets of states of the world, namely categories, into outcomes. See 
id. at 2176 (discussing the process of creating an interpretive signal in an interpretive model). 
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Cognitive theory shows that these models need to be sophisticated and 
diverse.187 The intuition can be grasped as follows. First, when agents use 
sophisticated interpretative models, they will tend to partition the set of 
possible states of the world into many categories (that is, more than when 
they use less sophisticated interpretative models). Second, when agents use 
diverse interpretative models, each individual will create a different partition 
of the possible states of the world.188 As a result, signal heterogeneity (the 
production of different predictions) stems from cognitive diversity among 
sophisticated agents rather than randomness (as for generated signals).189 It 
follows that information based on interpreted signals is more likely to be 
complementary, relative to information that is the result of generated signals. 
The interpretive models of shareholders and insiders are particularly 
likely to be sophisticated and diverse and, hence, complementary. To begin 
with, board members are selected for their “institutional competence,” which 
denotes both expertise and the ability to acquire and process information. 
Similarly, institutional shareholders, such as large mutual funds and hedge 
funds, are increasingly sophisticated, as they demonstrate a growing 
commitment to understanding the operations of their portfolio companies. 
Because of insiders’ access to private firm-specific information, their 
interpretative models can also realistically be assumed to be diverse from 
those used by shareholders. But diversity also is a defining feature of the 
investor crowd. Institutional investors such as pension and mutual funds have 
different business models and investment horizons than hedge funds.190 
Further, hedge funds themselves tend to have different business models and 
exhibit idiosyncratic features, especially when it comes to target selection.191 
Some hedge funds, for example, focus on targeting companies in certain 
industries; others are governance specialists.192 Each fund follows a different 
template in deciding when moving on a company.193 Indeed, investor 
diversity is quintessential to their ability to compete with each other. If 
investors shared the same business model, they would no longer have the 
prospect of delivering competitively superior performance. 
The diversity of insider and investor perspectives, experiences, and 
objectives increases the likelihood that they bring not just different but also 
complementary information to firm decision-making. As a result, if a 
 
187. Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, Some Microfoundations of Collective Wisdom, in COLLECTIVE 
WISDOM 56, 57 (Hélène Landemore & Jon Elster eds., 2012). 
188. More analytically, diverse interpretative models tend to produce negatively correlated 
predictions and negatively correlated predictions produce better aggregate outcomes. Id. at 57–58. 
189. Hong & Page, supra note 183, at 2175. 
190. See supra section II(C)(2). 
191. See WALKER, supra note 77, at 11–21 (comparing the business models and intervention 
strategies of the most important U.S. hedge funds). 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
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collaborative model provides a mechanism for aggregating that information, 
it can enable the firm to make better-informed decisions, thereby increasing 
firm value. 
2. Aggregating Shareholder Information: Collaboration Versus 
Markets.—As used in this Article, collaboration contemplates a direct 
deliberative process between boards and shareholders, similar to what 
typically happens in legislative bodies.194 Deliberation allows agents to 
convey their interpreted signals directly, to receive feedback from other 
participants, and to modify their signals in response to that feedback. The 
obvious alternative to collaboration is the aggregation of shareholder 
information through the capital markets. 
It is widely recognized that the public capital markets collect and 
incorporate a wide variety of firm-specific and industry information, 
information that is incorporated through pricing.195 Notably, Frederick Hayek 
was the first to emphasize how the dispersed individual knowledge 
aggregated through market contracting accurately determines prices, even if 
the average individual market participant cannot.196 Under Hayek’s epistemic 
version of Adam Smith’s invisible hand,197 the price system provides a form 
of mediated interaction between insiders and shareholders, which can be 
relied on to aggregate their respective information.198 Moving from this 
assumption, Jeffrey Gordon’s analysis of the independent board relies on the 
capital markets to convey shareholder information to independent 
directors.199 Under this model, shareholder information, including 
shareholders’ analysis of corporation decisions, is reflected by stock prices. 
Independent directors then use the information provided by prices for optimal 
 
194. See John Gastil & James P. Dillard, Increasing Political Sophistication Through Public 
Deliberation, 16 POL. COMM. 3, 5 (1999) (discussing the effects of direct deliberation in influencing 
judgment). 
195. The seminal treatment of the incorporation of information into market prices can be found 
in Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 
(1970); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 565–89 (1984) (exploring the mechanisms by which information is 
incorporated into prices). 
196. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 526 (1945). 
197. See Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 
9–12 (2009) (examining how Hayek’s “division of knowledge” idea, which emphasizes “the 
dispersed and tacit character of knowledge in markets,” originated as an “aggregative invisible-hand 
mechanism[]”). 
198. One could argue that because this view relies on trading as a transmission mechanism, 
markets could aggregate shareholder information effectively but never fully aggregate insider 
information in a context in which insiders are prohibited by law from trading on their private 
information. This limitation, however, is overcome when one considers that insiders’ disclosure 
obligations may also serve as a transmission mechanism, as both disclosure and trading serve to 
convey the agent’s information. 
199. Gordon, supra note 27, at 1470. 
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decision-making, evaluating that information against their own private 
information about corporate affairs. 
To the extent that prices provide a sufficient mechanism to aggregate 
relevant information, direct collaboration would thus seem to be unnecessary. 
We reject this conclusion and argue that the rise of shareholder collaboration 
responds to limitations in the ability of the capital markets to aggregate partial 
and complementary information. There are two sources of these limitations. 
First, there may be limitations to market efficiency.200 Although over time, 
prices may converge to fundamental values, time delays and noise may result 
in persistent gaps between prices and fundamental values.201 These gaps 
reduce the effectiveness of prices in informing business decisions. It follows 
that while prices can be useful for the ex post monitoring of corporate 
decisions, they are less useful for aggregating information on production 
decision-making.202 
Second, asset-pricing theory teaches that information is aggregated only 
when traders have substitute information.203 Here, substitute information is 
sufficiently similar information that a trader does not need other traders’ 
information to make predictions about the value of a project or company. For 
example, one trader might have information on a company’s sales, while 
another may have knowledge of a company’s distribution agreements. Both 
sets of information provide a proxy on the company’s future productivity, but 
neither prediction is substantially improved by access to the other trader’s 
information.204 As a result, each trader will trade based on her own 
information, which will then be incorporated in the company’s stock price as 
predicted by the Hayekian model. 
When traders have complementary information, the information of other 
traders enables each to make a more accurate prediction about the value of a 
project or company. Unlike substitute information, however, complementary 
information in competitive markets with partially informed traders may not 
get aggregated at all.205 Consider, for example, the case of a computer 
manufacturer that is ready to launch a new computer. One investor 
 
200. See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 272 (2014) (observing 
that “market efficiency is a matter of degree”). 
201. For a more technical analysis of the sources of market inefficiency, see William W. Bratton 
& Simone M. Sepe, Corporate Law and the Myth of Efficient Market Control, CORNELL L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 25–34). 
202. Id. at 34. 
203. Asset-pricing theory in this case talks of “non-separable” securities. See Michael 
Ostrovsky, Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets with Strategic Traders, 80 
ECONOMETRICA 2595, 2596 (2012) (“If the security is ‘non-separable,’ then there exists a prior and 
an equilibrium such that information does not get aggregated.”). 
204. In the actuality, information is never totally substitute or complementary but rather 
partially complementary and partially substitute. Therefore, the representation in the text above, as 
well as in the example in subpart III(B), should be intended as providing a stylized illustration of 
current informational structures. 
205. Ostrovsky, supra note 203, at 2596. 
FISCH.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/1/20  6:36 PM 
898 Texas Law Review [Vol. 98:863 
specializes in hardware products, while the other trader is an expert in 
software. In this case, the two sets of information are complementary because 
each investor could benefit from access to the other’s information to make a 
better prediction about the compatibility of the new computer’s hardware 
with the software available (or forthcoming) in the market. It follows that 
both investors will trade on incomplete information about the project’s value, 
which will be reflected in an inaccurate evaluation of the project and, 
therefore, inaccurate pricing of the company’s stock. 
Unlike market trading, a deliberative process allows the investors to 
combine their complementary information about the new computer project to 
evaluate the project and transmit relevant knowledge to each other or the 
board or both. Accordingly, when different pieces of information are 
complementary such that the possession of one piece of information increases 
the value of acquiring another piece, only the direct communication of 
information allows corporate actors to extract that added value, while the 
mediated transmission of information through market trading cannot. Only 
through a deliberative process can investors convey their full information set, 
which may have multiple dimensions (meaning that one signal may be 
associated with multiple states of the world). In contrast, when investors 
communicate through trading, they can only observe market prices, which 
are unidimensional objects. 
3. The Value of Collaboration: An Illustration.—We offer, in this 
section, a hypothetical example to illustrate in more detail the potential 
superiority of collaboration over market trading for aggregating the 
complementary information of corporate insiders and shareholders. For 
simplicity, the example focuses on the relationship between the board and a 
single investor, but the analysis can be extended to cases involving 
information possessed by multiple participants, including managers, 
independent boards, hedge funds, and institutional investors. 
Consider a computer manufacturer, which we will call NewSys, that is 
about to launch a new computer. Similar to the stylized illustration at the end 
of section 2 above, we assume that the board of NewSys has private 
information on the hardware produced by NewSys, while RedRock, an 
investor, has private information on the software that is available on the 
market,206 so that the two information sets are complementary.207 
 
206. RedRock’s information may come from its engagement with other portfolio companies or 
industry expertise that it has developed through research. The board may also have information on 
available market software but not the same information as RedRock. 
207. For simplicity, the example represents the investors’ partial information in terms of 
asymmetric information, meaning that both the board and the investors have private information not 
available to the other party. Conceptually, however, this need not be the case. For example, in the 
Microsoft case discussed above, ValueAct did not hold private information not available to the 
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Assume that the value of NewSys critically depends on the success of 
the computer project, which turns on the compatibility of the new hardware 
with the available and emerging software, the standards for which are being 
developed in the industry. The uncertainty affecting the compatibility 
between the hardware and the software is captured by four possible states of 
the world, whose occurrence is equiprobable (i.e., each state materializes 
with a probability of one-fourth). These states are A, B, C, and D and have 
the following characteristics: 
Under State A, the hardware produced by NewSys is of Type 1, while 
a new operating system available from developers in the market is of 
the kind Compatible 1. This means that the developers’ new software 
matches NewSys’s hardware; 
under State B, the new hardware is of Type 1, while the new software 
is of the kind Compatible 2. This means that the available software 
does not match the new hardware; 
under State C, the new hardware is of Type 2, while the new software 
is of the kind Compatible 1. This means that the available software 
does not match the new hardware; 
under State D, the new hardware is of Type 2, while the new software 
is of the kind Compatible 2. This means that the available software 
matches the new hardware. 
NewSys’s computer project will be valuable if its hardware is 
compatible with the new software, as captured by States A and D, but not in 
States B and C. To capture this, assume that shares of NewSys stock have 
value equal to $200 under States A and D and zero under States B and C. 
Further assume that under the above informational structure, where the 
board has private information on the hardware and RedRock has private 
information on the available software, each receives a signal based on its 
private information. The board’s received signal can be either 𝑎! or 𝑎". If the 
signal is 𝑎!, the board knows that the new computer is of Type 1; therefore, 
the state of the world will be either A or B with the same probability. If the 
signal is 𝑎", the board knows that the new computer is of Type 2; therefore, 
the state of the world will be either C or D with the same probability. 
Similarly, RedRock receives a signal that can be either 𝑟! or 𝑟". If the signal 
is 𝑟!, RedRock knows that the software is of the kind Compatible 1; therefore, 
the state of the world will be either A or C with the same probability. If the 
signal is 𝑟", RedRock knows that the software is of the kind Compatible 2; 
 
Microsoft board but rather proposed a different interpretation of information shared by the board. 
See supra text accompanying notes 114–23. This said, from a modeling perspective, a different 
interpretation of the same information can be represented, in a first approximation, as novel 
information and hence as a matter of asymmetric information. Therefore, the use of an asymmetric 
information setting in our example imports no loss of generality. 
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therefore, the state of the world will be either B or D with the same 
probability. 
Under this information structure, both the board and RedRock expect 
the value of the computer project as reflected in the price of NewSys stock to 
be $100.208 If the board receives the signal 𝑎!	, the state of the world can be 
either A or B with the same probability, making the expected value of 
NewSys stock ½ × ($200) + ½ × (0) = $100. The same holds if the board 
receives the signal 𝑎" (under which the state of the world can be either C or 
D with the same probability). Likewise, if RedRock receives the signal 𝑟! 
(under which the state of the world can be either A or C with the same 
probability), the expected value of NewSys stock to RedRock is also $100. 
The same holds if RedRock receives the signal 𝑟" (under which the state of 
the world can be either B or D with the same probability). 
Competitive trading in this case will not aggregate the complementary 
information of the board and RedRock, as each party is unable to infer 
anything from the other party’s valuation of the NewSys stock. Under the 
price signal reflecting RedRock’s beliefs, the board will not be able to update 
its beliefs about the compatibility of the computer project with the software 
market. This simple illustration then shows that competitive trading does not 
allow market participants to coordinate information to make value-
maximizing operational decisions. Indeed, in this scenario, the board will 
underinvest relative to a scenario in which it knows about the project’s 
compatibility with the software and hence that the true value of the project to 
NewSys is $200. Correspondingly, the board will overinvest relative to a 
scenario in which it can determine that the project is flawed due to an absence 
of compatibility. 
Consider now a scenario where the board and RedRock can directly 
communicate with each other. For example, suppose the board receives the 
signal 𝑎! (under which the true state of the world is either State A or B) and 
RedRock receives the signal 𝑟"	(under which the true state of the world is 
either State B or D) and they exchange this information. Through this 
deliberation, the board and RedRock will learn that the only state that is 
consistent with their respective signals is State B. That is, they would both 
know that computer is of Type 1, while the software is of the kind 
Compatible 2, which implies that the computer project has no value. This 
would enable the board to make a better operational decision by halting the 
hardware investment. On the other hand, under reciprocal signals that are 
 
208. Defining NewSys stock as S, this result is calculated as follows: S|𝑎! = S|𝑎" = S|𝑟! = S|𝑟" 
= 100. More analytically, S|𝑏! = [Prob (A)|𝑎!] × ($200) + [Prob (B)|𝑎!] × (0) = $100, where, by 
Bayes’s Rule, Prob (A)|𝑎! = [Prob (𝑎!|A) × Prob (A)]/[Prob (𝑎)] = (½ × ¼)/(½) = ½ as Prob (𝑎!) 
= Prob (A) + Prob (B) = ½. In this example Prob (B)|𝑏!, Prob (C)|𝑏", Prob (D)|𝑏", Prob (A)|𝑟!, 
Prob (C)|𝑟!, Prob (B)|𝑟", and Prob (D)|𝑟" are each equal to ½. Because S|𝑎" = S|𝑟! = S|𝑟" are also 
computed following the same procedure, it is clear why both the board and RedRock expect NewSys 
stock to be equal to $100. 
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compatible with a matched technology (i.e., State A or D), the board would 
know that it is desirable to expand the investment in the computer project. 
Therefore, aggregating the board’s complementary information with that of 
investor RedRock would enable NewSys to match its operational decision-
making to the state of the outside world in a way that maximizes firm value 
(and stock price).209 
B. The Governance of Collaboration 
The preceding discussion has shown that collaboration is socially 
efficient, as it can contribute value that neither unilateral decision-making 
nor the mediated transmission of information through markets can provide. 
We now turn to the governance of collaboration, drawing on insights from 
the theory of cooperative games to identify what governance structures can 
help ensure that both corporate insiders and investors have the right 
individual incentives to collaborate.210 
1. Economic Rights.—In the language of game theory, shareholder 
collaboration can be understood as a “cooperative” game. A game is defined 
as cooperative when players form “coalitions” to achieve their mutual 
goals.211 Two preliminary conditions determine whether it is worthwhile for 
 
209. For completeness, we also consider the case in which information is substitute rather than 
complementary. In this case, assume that RedRock receives an unambiguous signal that the true 
state is A, so that Prob (A)|𝑟! = 1 holds. Also assume that the board still receives the original signal 
𝑎!, so that Prob (A)|𝑎 = ½. Since RedRock has perfect information on the true state, while the board 
only has partial information, RedRock does not need to aggregate the board’s information to 
improve its predictions. Under these different circumstances, upon the occurrence of State A and 
after receiving its informative signal, RedRock will be willing to buy more NewSys stock, as it 
knows that NewSys’s fundamental value is $200, and RedRock’s trading will drive up the share 
price. RedRock will be willing to buy NewSys shares as long as the price is below $200. Upon 
observing RedRock’s trading, the board will in turn realize that the only state that is compatible 
with its private information (under which the true state can be either A or B) and with a trading price 
above $100 is State A. This is consistent with the conclusion that when information is substitute, 
market trading efficiently aggregates information. Note, however, that this aggregation does not 
solve other asset-pricing imperfections such as timing issues. Indeed, sophisticated investors with 
short-term business models may have distortionary incentives, including incentives not to reveal 
their information immediately. These distortions increase when investors have market power. See 
Giovanni Cespa & Xavier Vives, Dynamic Trading and Asset Prices: Keynes vs. Hayek, 79 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 539, 540 (2012) (formally showing that in a dynamic market, rational investors can 
find it profitable to speculate on short-term price differentials). 
210. It is worth observing that one can describe most strategic interactions as employing either 
cooperative or noncooperative game theory. See MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A 
COURSE IN GAME THEORY 255–56 (1994) (explaining the differences between cooperative and 
noncooperative approaches when used to represent individual strategic decisions in a coalition). In 
the latter case, the model becomes one of bargaining with alternative offers. However, while one 
could argue that the analytical result would be the same, we believe that cooperative game theory is 
better suited to represent the novel collaborative dynamics between corporate insiders and outside 
investors. 
211. A cooperative solution involves a stable set of outcomes such that it meets two conditions: 
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the players to form a coalition. First, the players must be able to do better 
together than alone—this is the superadditivity condition.212 Second, larger 
coalitions must be more valuable than smaller ones—this is the monotonicity 
condition.213 
Insider–shareholder collaboration satisfies both conditions. First, as 
detailed in the preceding subparts, participatory deliberative mechanisms 
allow the corporation to capture the added value of insider and shareholder 
complementary inputs. Assuming that both insiders and shareholders receive 
a portion of this added value, collaboration thus satisfies superadditivity. 
Second, the value added by collaboration naturally increases with the number 
of investors participating in the deliberative process so long as information is 
complementary. As a result, larger coalitions will outperform smaller 
coalitions and therefore satisfy monotonicity.214 
The theory of cooperative games also teaches that a coalition must be 
beneficial for each individual player. That is, a player’s incentive to 
participate requires that a player’s expected gains from participation exceed 
what the player would receive by playing individually outside the 
coalition.215 As applied to shareholder collaboration, this implies that the 
participation costs involved by collaboration must be reflected in the 
expected payoff. For example, collaborating shareholders may incur 
significant research costs216 that they will be unwilling to bear unless the 
share of the gains from collaboration compensates them for such costs. 
This constraint raises questions about the appropriate allocation of 
economic rights—how the value produced by the coalition should be divided 
among its members. In the corporate context, the existing allocation of 
economic rights contains two components, which, we argue, are by their 
nature compatible with insider–shareholder collaboration. The first is the 
equity contract, which allocates gains from the corporation in a manner that 
is proportionate to investors’ economic interests. The second is equity-based 
compensation for corporate insiders—officers and directors. 
 
“(1) for every outcome outside the [cooperative] set some coalition can achieve an outcome inside 
the set that is better for all its members and (2) no coalition can achieve an outcome inside the set 
better for all its members than another outcome inside the set.” PAUL WEIRICH, COLLECTIVE 
RATIONALITY 152 (2010). 
212. MICHAEL MASCHLER ET AL., GAME THEORY 671 (Mike Borns ed., Ziv Hellman trans., 
2013). 
213. Id. at 672. 
214. Notably, the shift to reconcentrated equity ownership both enables the implementation of 
participatory deliberative mechanisms and limits the number of investors who possess the incentives 
and resources to collaborate with insiders. 
215. WEIRICH, supra note 211, at 156. 
216. Under the assumption that proxy-fight costs are, at least in part, indicative of an investor’s 
research costs, it is worth observing that a campaign ending in a proxy fight has an average cost for 
the investor of around $10.71 million. Nickolay Gantchev, The Costs of Shareholder Activism: 
Evidence from a Sequential Decision Model, 107 J. FIN. ECON. 611 (2013). 
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The pro-rata rule embedded in the equity contract is the distinctive 
feature that makes this contract compatible with shareholder collaboration, 
thus supporting the view that collaboration is consistent with the existing 
structure of corporate law. Indeed, the pro-rata rule facilitates efficient 
collaboration in several ways. First, by ensuring that shareholders participate 
in the value added proportionately to the size of their equity stake, pro-rata 
sharing makes it rational for shareholders to engage in the production of 
complementary information and make a substantial investment prior to 
collaborating.217 
Second, by ensuring that investors internalize both the benefits and the 
costs of engagement, the pro-rata rule anchoring investors’ payoff from 
collaboration to the size of their equity stakes increases the likelihood that 
collaborative efforts will be designed to enhance firm value. 
Third, the equity contract also reduces (but does not eliminate, as we 
note below) the concern that collaboration might be a vehicle through which 
players collude to obtain private benefits. Such concern, for example, 
undermines the viability of collaboration in the administrative context, where 
critics worry that collaborative processes might be exploited by powerful 
industry players and public interest groups to the detriment of the general 
public interest.218 In the corporate context, this risk is reduced because the 
equity contract provides a premium to all shareholders from efficient 
collaboration (proportionally to their equity stake), leveling the bargaining 
power of all interested parties in the distribution of the gains arising from 
deliberation. 
Equity-based compensation contracts, which tie executive 
compensation to equity returns, further ensure the compatibility of 
collaboration with the existing structure of corporate law by giving 
executives their own incentives to participate in value-increasing 
collaboration. Indeed, executive-compensation structures have evolved over 
the past thirty years to feature both an increasing proportion of equity-based 
compensation219 and compensation structures that involve longer time 
horizons for the realization of increases in stock price.220 Outside directors 
also receive a substantial proportion of their compensation in the form of 
 
217. Empirical evidence suggests that hedge fund activists, for example, typically acquire 
substantial stakes in target companies before publicly announcing their presence, allowing them to 
benefit if their activism increases firm value. E.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Pre-Disclosure 
Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 1, 9–10 (2013). 
218. Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 
1, 83 (1997). 
219. Kahan & Rock, supra note 26, at 884. 
220. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 
U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1925–26 (2010) (describing issuer adoption of compensation plans that require 
executives to hold stock until retirement). 
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equity such as stock options and restricted stock rather than cash.221 By 
aligning the interests of insiders with those of shareholders, these 
compensation structures also create an incentive for both to exploit 
collaboration to maximize firm value. In addition, compensation structures 
that involve longer time horizons encourage insiders to collaborate to 
produce long-term value for the firm. 
2. Decision-Making Rights.—In addition to economic rights, a coalition 
also involves decision rights—bargained-for rules that the coalition’s 
members accept to regulate their individual say in the deliberative process. 
In the corporate context, efficient collaboration involves questions on the 
optimal allocation of decision-making power between the board and the 
engaged shareholders and the relative say of each shareholder. 
Given the positive implications of the equity contract for managing 
collaboration’s economic rights, one might think that the “one share, one 
vote” rule embedded in that contract should naturally apply to the decision 
rights of the collaborative process. We question this conclusion primarily on 
the basis that shareholders with similar equity stakes may not be equally 
positioned to produce valuable firm-specific information. For example, a 
hedge fund that has a private-equity-like investment policy and only invests 
in a restricted portfolio of companies (as is the case of ValueAct, for 
example)222 might be better positioned to produce complementary 
information than a hedge fund of similar size with a larger portfolio of 
companies or a larger but highly diversified index fund (as in the case of 
Vanguard, for example). 
Insights from game theory are again useful here. In cooperative games, 
gains are distributed according to each player’s marginal contribution to the 
game’s outcome, that is, the incremental value added by that player joining 
the game.223 Consistent with this approach, we suggest that a party’s say over 
the collaborative process should be determined according to the marginal 
contribution of that party’s informational inputs. The marginal contribution 
criterion is suited to capture the “specificity” of an informational investment 
in a corporation––as under this criterion, specific information that belongs 
exclusively to one investor is valued more than information that is shared by 
more investors. Put differently, the marginal contribution criterion is well 
suited to reflect the value of the sunk costs made by an investor in a given 
 
221. See, e.g., Nitzan Shilon, Putting Directors’ Money Where Their Mouths Are: A New 
Approach to Improving Corporate Takeover Dynamics, 2017 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 511, 536 & 
n.57 (observing that “director pay increasingly includes stock” and restricted stock). 
222. WALKER, supra note 77, at 17. 
223. This is referred to as the “Shapley value” criterion. MASCHLER ET AL., supra note 212, at 
760–61. More technically, in a cooperative game, the possible efficient joint acts (here, the different 
coalitions of the board and the investors) are distinguished by the order in which the players may 
form a coalition of all players. See id. The Shapley value then accords each player the average of 
her marginal contributions to the possible efficient joint acts. See id. 
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corporation, costs that may not be directly proportional to the size of the 
investor’s equity stake.224 
In practice, the contribution criterion will frequently presume that the 
board of directors is the “player” with the highest marginal contribution, as 
it is the decision-maker that consistently provides the most specific 
informational inputs about firm operations. The jargon of game theorists 
would therefore term the board the “veto player,” without which the coalition 
cannot be formed in the first place.225 As a positive matter, this presumption 
is consistent with the substantial authority corporate law grants to the board 
of directors in managing the corporate affairs.226 The access of directors 
(especially executive directors), as insiders, to unique, firm-specific private 
information also normatively supports this presumption. Indeed, the need to 
aggregate the partial, complementary information of insiders and 
shareholders does not displace standard asymmetric information issues but 
rather stands on top of such issues. Making the board the game’s veto player 
thus addresses the twin problem of partial and asymmetric information.227 
The presumption that the board is the player with the highest marginal 
contribution should not be absolute, however. Rather, this presumption 
should be regarded as weaker in situations in which the firm is 
underperforming. This underperformance signals that investors may be more 
likely to add potential value through the production of complementary 
information. Here the collaborative-activist strategy of presenting the board 
and, if need be, its fellow shareholders, with a detailed plan documenting its 
research into the company provides the connection between the activist’s 
informational contribution and vesting the activist with an enhanced 
deliberative role.228 The mechanism for providing an activist with decision-
making power is the grant of board seats. The success of the activist in 
obtaining board representation depends on the quality of the information that 
 
224. We do not propose to use the marginal contribution criterion for economic rights because 
it would create incentives for investors to overstate their contributions (that is, the value of their 
complementary information). 
225. See MASCHLER ET AL., supra note 212, at 681 (demonstrating mathematically the power 
of a veto player to scuttle any coalitions it does not support). 
226. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
227. Note, however, the difference from the managerial-power model’s characterization of the 
board’s informational advantage. Under that model, the board’s access to private information about 
the corporate affairs serves to exclude shareholder informational inputs. Under the collaborative 
model, the board’s position as veto player is instrumental to collaboration and hence to the inclusion, 
rather than the exclusion, of shareholder inputs. 
228. Even skeptics of shareholder activism recognize that credible activists typically approach 
the issue with an extensive, well-researched proposal for change. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Dealing 
with Activist Hedge Funds and Other Activist Investors, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE 
& FIN. REG. (Jan. 26, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/26/dealing-with-activist-
hedge-funds-and-other-activist-investors/ [https://perma.cc/TB39-M6CL] (observing that “[t]he 
activist may approach a company with an extensive high-quality analysis of the company’s business 
that supports the activist’s recommendations”). 
FISCH.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/1/20  6:36 PM 
906 Texas Law Review [Vol. 98:863 
it presents. Moreover, both the board and other shareholders play a valuable 
role in vetting the activist’s contribution because the activist is only in a 
position to obtain board representation if it comes forward with a credible 
plan that is likely to receive the support of the other shareholders. 
From this perspective, the marginal contribution criterion helps 
reconceptualize settlements in which a board voluntarily appoints investors’ 
representatives in a constructive context as a reflection of a high 
informational contribution on the investors’ part. For example, in the 
Microsoft case discussed above,229 the appointment of a ValueAct 
representative to the board reveals the importance that ValueAct’s 
“perception problem” approach had for reforming Microsoft’s business. 
More generally, the marginal-contribution criterion provides a basis for 
structuring the form of shareholder collaboration and choosing between the 
broad spectrum of available collaborative schemes. For example, higher 
marginal contributions are more likely to be reflected in greater decision 
rights such as through board representation. Conversely, relatively low 
contributions are more likely to be organized in the form of “non-binding 
outside” deliberation, such as informal meetings. 
IV. The Challenges of the Collaborative Model 
The discussion in Part III demonstrates how collaboration can increase 
firm value and identifies the conditions necessary for collaboration to be 
effective when both shareholders and insiders act unselfishly. Under this 
assumption, collaboration is not just socially efficient but also individually 
efficient for both insiders and collaborating investors. In the real world, 
however, things can go wrong. Specifically, insiders and collaborating 
shareholders may act opportunistically and either jeopardize the viability of 
value-increasing collaboration or exploit collaboration to further their own 
interest at the expense of overall firm value. Existing principles of corporate 
law, which operate largely from the premise of insider–shareholder 
confrontation, emphasize these risks. 
In this Part, we identify three basic categories of risks. First, there is the 
risk that shareholders and insiders will each engage in detrimental 
opportunistic behaviors, exacerbating a firm’s conflicts of interest at the 
expense of firm value. Second, shareholders that gain access to firm-specific 
information as a result of the collaborative process may misuse that 
information to benefit themselves or to harm the corporation. Third, there is 
the risk of insider–shareholder collusion that may sacrifice the interests of 
other shareholders or nonshareholder constituencies. Corporate law currently 
employs tools such as fiduciary duties and confidentiality agreements to 
 
229. See supra notes 114–23 and accompanying text. 
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address these concerns, but the tools are ill-suited for a collaborative context 
and should be rethought. 
A. Conflicts of Interest 
1. Transparency, Accountability, and Opportunism.—Collaboration 
increases concerns about conflicts of interest in several ways. First, 
collaboration may reduce the transparency of firm decision-making. Second, 
collaboration may limit the accountability of corporate decision-makers. 
Third, collaborating shareholders may exploit their influence over corporate 
affairs opportunistically, pursuing objectives with respect to firm value that 
differ from those of other shareholders. 
The recent increase in negotiated settlements that provide activists with 
board representation is an example of both reduced transparency and 
accountability. As discussed above,230 insiders are increasingly voluntarily 
appointing one or more activist-designed directors to the board to settle an 
activist campaign. In many cases, the settlement occurs rapidly, before 
outside shareholders have taken a position on the activist’s agenda, and in 
some cases, even before the activist’s role has become public. The selection 
of the new directors is a matter of negotiation between the insiders and the 
activist, displacing the role of outside shareholders in the election process.231 
The terms of the settlement may also limit the ability of the new directors to 
criticize corporate policy or to vote against board proposals.232 For these 
reasons, a number of investors have begun to raise objections to these 
settlements.233 
Whether or not they obtain board representation, shareholders may 
exploit their influence for opportunistic reasons. The most commonly cited 
risk of shareholder opportunism is short-termism.234 Some investors, for 
 
230. See supra text accompanying notes 100–03. 
231. See Rakhi Kumar & Ron O’Hanley, Protecting the Interests of Long-Term Shareholders 
in Activist Engagements, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 17, 2016), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/10/17/protecting-the-interests-of-long-term-shareholders-in-
activist-engagements/ [https://perma.cc/8GCG-E68S] (expressing concern that “in some cases these 
settlements are being reached too quickly and without any input from other shareholders”). 
232. Che Odom, Companies Using Deals with Activists to Protect Directors, BLOOMBERG 
BNA (June 15, 2016), https://web.archive.org/web/20160616052445/https://www.bna.com/ 
companies-using-deals-n57982074192/ [https://perma.cc/BB7V-KNAF?type=image]. 
233. See, e.g., Kai Haakon Liekefett & Lawrence Elbaum, Think Twice Before Settling with an 
Activist, LAW360 (Dec. 9, 2016, 12:21 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/869160/think-twice-
before-settling-with-an-activist [https://perma.cc/NB74-4RRF] (observing that institutional 
investors “are now troubled that companies may settle with activists without seeking the input of 
other shareholders”); see also Coffee, supra note 99, at 25 (charging that these settlement 
agreements disenfranchise other shareholders that may not support the activist’s nominees). 
234. Short-termism can be understood, we argue, as a form of shareholder self-dealing that 
produces a conflict between the interests of the short-term shareholders and shareholders generally. 
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example, hedge funds with short-term-oriented business models, may benefit 
from short-term operational strategies that sacrifice long-term firm value.235 
A number of commentators have argued that “the short-term strategies of 
many activists are frequently at odds” with the investment horizon of other 
shareholders.236 Delaware Supreme Court Justice Leo Strine, for example, 
has contended that, although some activist hedge funds are committed to 
long-term improvement of their portfolio companies, others pursue business 
strategies calculated to produce a short-term price “pop,” at which point they 
exit, leaving “buy and hold investors” to bear the consequences.237 
But shareholders may also have other conflicts that collaboration may 
exacerbate. A shareholder may seek to influence a decision at one portfolio 
company to improve the value of its position at another company.238 Or 
shareholders may have what Marcel Kahan and Edward Rock have termed 
“hedging-related conflicts” when they hold positions in different types or 
 
See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 
STAN. L. REV. 67, 114–16 (2016) (describing this conflict). 
235. See, e.g., In re PLX Tech. Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 9880-VCL, 2015 WL 13501398 
(Del. Ch. Sept. 3, 2015) (order granting in part defendants’ motion to dismiss) (citing the concern 
that “particular types of investors may espouse short-term investment strategies and structure their 
affairs to benefit economically from those strategies”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: 
The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established 
by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 790–91 (2015) (arguing 
that activist shareholder “pressure may logically lead to strategies that sacrifice long-term 
performance for short-term shareholder wealth”); Liekefett & Elbaum, supra note 232 (stating that 
activists “focus on short-term, event-driven strategies”). Shareholder strategies that are often 
criticized as short-term include investment banking interventions like agitating for a sale of the 
company, causing the issuer to pay out higher cash dividends or take on additional debt, and efforts 
to cut costs, including research and development. Francis Byrd et al., Short-Term Shareholder 
Activists, HEDGE FUND J. (July 2007), https://thehedgefundjournal.com/short-term-shareholder-
activists/ [https://perma.cc/867J-YE9H]. 
236. Liekefett & Elbaum, supra note 233. 
237. Strine, supra note 42, at 1908, 1928. 
238. See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1071 (2007) (noting that “a hedge fund that owns 
shares in Company A may try to use that position to increase the value of another position, say in 
Company B, rather than to maximize the share price of Company A”). A well-known example 
involves Perry Corp.’s acquisition of additional voting rights in Mylan Pharmaceuticals in an effort 
to sway the shareholder vote necessary to approve Mylan’s acquisition of King Pharmaceuticals. 
Perry held a substantial interest in King, and King shareholders stood to obtain a 61% premium if 
the merger went through, but the deal required the approval by Mylan’s shareholders and did not 
appear to be value-enhancing for Mylan. Perry therefore hoped to use its voting power in Mylan to 
push through a merger that was not value-enhancing for the company. Several commentators have 
discussed the Mylan–King merger and Perry’s conflict of interest. E.g., Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard 
Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 811, 828–29 (2006); Kahan & Rock, supra note 237, at 1075–76; Steven M. Haas, SEC 
Resolves Empty Voting Action Involving King-Mylan Merger, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 19, 2009), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2009/08/19/sec-
resolves-empty-voting-action-involving-king-mylan-merger/ [https://perma.cc/M55T-GF8B]. 
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classes of securities239 or when they hold both long and short positions.240 
More generally, collaboration creates a risk that collaborating shareholders 
will use their engagement to further their objectives—financial, political, or 
social—in ways that favor their personal interests and do not align with the 
interests of their fellow shareholders.241 For example, some commentators 
have criticized large mutual funds for advocating sustainability objectives.242 
2. Fiduciary Obligations.—The risks raised by shareholders’ conflict of 
interests have also led to concerns about the conduct of activist 
representatives who serve on the board of directors. Activist directors raise 
unique fiduciary issues because they are called to serve both the corporation 
(that is, the shareholders at large) and their nominating sponsor.243 As noted 
above, the interests of the activist may differ from those of the corporation or 
the other shareholders.244 Although a shareholder has the legal right to act out 
of self-interest,245 once an activist nominee joins the board, it may not further 
that shareholder’s interests over those of other shareholders.246 This has led 
some commentators to observe that “the concept of activist representatives 
as board members is fraught with potential for conflict.”247 
Similar issues have arisen in the VC context in relation to the 
appointment of constituency directors, who may be held liable for breaching 
their fiduciary duty by favoring the interests of one set of shareholders over 
 
239. An analogous phenomenon occurs in the bankruptcy context because hedge funds, which 
have often purchased deeply discounted debt securities, have interests that differ both from other 
creditors and from shareholders. See Bo J. Howell, Hedge Funds: A New Dimension in Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 35, 46 (2008) (observing how such conflicts 
can create problems when hedge funds serve on a creditors’ committee). 
240. Kahan & Rock, supra note 237, at 1072–74. Kahan and Rock describe an example 
involving the planned acquisition of MONY by AXA in 2004. Id. at 1073–74; see also In re MONY 
Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 668 (Del. Ch. 2004) (describing hedge fund conflicts). 
241. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1286 (2008) (describing efforts by CalPERS to use its influence as a 
shareholder to further the union interests in a battle with Safeway over worker benefits). 
242. In 2018 guidance, for example, the Department of Labor warned that “the Department has 
rejected a construction of ERISA that would render ERISA’s tight limits on the use of plan assets 
illusory and that would permit plan fiduciaries to expend trust assets to promote myriad public 
policy preferences.” U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULLETIN NO. 2018-01 (2018) 
(alterations omitted) (quoting Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights 
and Written Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting Policies or Guidelines, 81 
Fed. Reg. 95879, 95881 (Dec. 29, 2016)). 
243. E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a Director 
Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 774 (2008). 
244. See Sepe, supra note 58, at 341–60 (providing a detailed law and economics discussion of 
the matter). 
245. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 241, at 1273 (noting shareholders typically do not owe 
a fiduciary duty to the corporation). 
246. See, e.g., Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. L. 239, 
240 (2009) (describing the fiduciary concept in the corporation). 
247. Liekefett & Elbaum, supra note 233. 
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another.248 Corporate law has struggled with the tension between this 
divergence of interest and classic fiduciary principles, a struggle illustrated 
by the Trados249 decision, in which the Delaware Chancery Court noted that 
constituency directors who favor the interests of preferred stockholders over 
those of common stockholders may breach their fiduciary duties.250 
Trados illustrates the limits of fiduciary duties in dealing with horizontal 
conflicts among shareholders. One of us has argued that the principle of party 
autonomy should operate as a limiting principle to the application of 
fiduciary duties, and a constituency director should not be viewed as 
conflicted merely because he or she is acting in the interests of that party.251 
Shareholder collaboration increases the potential for horizontal conflicts and 
requires corporate law to take a more expansive view of mechanisms 
designed to allocate shared control without subjecting those mechanisms to 
the pervasive limits of conventional fiduciary principles.252 
The concern about conflicts is not limited to constituency directors. 
When shareholders collaborate with corporate insiders, they are acting 
simultaneously for their private benefit and for the benefit of the corporation 
in a manner that is designed to influence corporate decisions. The potential 
for conflicts has led some commentators to call for a broader scope of 
fiduciary duties when shareholders collaborate with insiders. Iman Anatwabi 
and Lynn Stout, for example, argued that activist hedge funds’ increasing 
control over operational decisions should cause us to reconsider corporate 
law’s current restrictive approach to shareholders’ fiduciary obligations. 
Indeed, they argued, a shareholder should owe fiduciary duties whenever it 
“manages to successfully influence the company’s actions with regard to a 
particular issue in which that shareholder has a material, personal economic 
interest.”253 
This approach is both too broad and too restrictive. Collaboration does 
not and should not convert shareholders into fiduciaries, thereby imposing 
upon them the burden of demonstrating that, when they attempt to influence 
corporate decisions, their actions conform to the strict obligations of 
 
248. For an illustration of the potential divergence between the interests of shareholders and 
creditors and its implications for corporate decision-making, see Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, 
N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *33–34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 
1991). 
249. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958 (Del. Ch. July 24, 
2009). 
250. Id. at *7. 
251. Sepe, supra note 58, at 377–78. 
252. We note that the Delaware legislature endorsed this approach in the context of the 
corporate opportunity doctrine. See Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the 
Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1075, 1077–79 (2017) (empirically analyzing the Delaware statutory amendment enabling 
corporations to opt out of the corporate opportunity doctrine by contract). 
253. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 241, at 1295. Notably, the authors focus their proposal 
primarily on activist hedge funds. 
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disinterestedness and unselfishness.254 Allowing shareholders to pursue their 
personal interests is a fundamental component of corporate law, and it is a 
critical component of the incentive structure for effective collaboration. 
Indeed, the legal requirement of selflessness associated with the role as a 
fiduciary would chill all types of shareholder engagement and, as a result, 
defang the enhanced involvement of shareholders that has transformed 
corporations from the time of Berle and Means. 
Moreover, premising fiduciary obligations on a shareholder’s ability to 
influence corporate decisions is impractical. Shareholders can influence firm 
decision-making through a range of mechanisms, from the introduction of 
shareholder proposals to participation in corporate governance organizations. 
Even a small shareholder’s actions may be outcome determinative. In the 
Proctor & Gamble proxy contest, for example, the margin of victory was 
approximately 42,000 votes (out of a total of nearly two billion).255 
Accordingly, the vote of any shareholder that voted more than 42,000 shares 
was, by definition, outcome determinative, and under a broad definition of 
fiduciary such as that proposed by Anabtawi and Stout, such a shareholder 
would be held to a duty-of-loyalty standard in defending its voting decision. 
3. Insiders’ Conflicts.—Insiders present different types of conflicts. 
The most obvious is management entrenchment. Corporate insiders may 
make value-decreasing decisions that allow them to preserve private benefits, 
including empire-building, large compensation packages, perks, and the 
power and prestige of their positions. Although management entrenchment 
is not a concern specific to the collaborative model of the corporation, 
shareholder collaboration presents distinctive considerations. First, although 
shareholder engagement has the potential to reduce entrenchment, the risk 
remains that entrenched management might be systematically nonresponsive 
and noncollaborative. This is because refusing to collaborate is rational for 
management if it allows firm insiders to preserve private benefits that they 
could lose in a deliberative process.256 
 
254. The Department of Labor’s effort to impose fiduciary obligations on brokers when they 
provide investment advice in connection with a retirement plan raises similar issues about the 
feasibility of subjecting a market participant acting out of financial motives to a legal requirement 
to act selflessly. See Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 366, 388 (5th Cir. 
2018) (invalidating DOL fiduciary rule). As one commentator observes: “By nature, any 
compensation places the interests of the adviser in conflict with those of the client.” Blaine F. Aikin, 
Mitigating Conflicts of Interest in Compensation, INV. NEWS (Oct. 25, 2017, 4:19 PM), http:// 
investmentnews.com/article/20171025/FREE/171025/FREE/171029963/mitigating-conflicts-of-
interest-in-compensation [https://perma.cc/QUW7-HU3G]. 
255. Sharon Terlep & David Benoit, P&G Concedes Proxy Fight, Adds Nelson Peltz to Its 
Board, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2017, 7:18 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/p-g-concedes-proxy-
fight-adds-nelson-peltz-to-its-board-1513377485 [https://perma.cc/52GP-6M4P]. 
256. This raises the question of whether officers and directors have a fiduciary duty to 
collaborate with shareholders and whether their refusal to do so could, under some circumstances, 
be actionable. 
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Second, there is also the risk that some collaborating investors may 
increase managerial moral hazard by reducing their monitoring or otherwise 
acquiescing in insider private gains in exchange for concessions. Those 
concessions might, in the case of a mutual fund, be governance reforms such 
as board refreshment. In the case of an activist hedge fund, the concessions 
might be the payment of a cash dividend. Such concessions could be low cost 
for the insiders, cosmetic, or favor a hedge fund’s short-term interests, but 
the point is both that they relieve insiders from the pressure of investor 
oversight and that they are likely to take the form of negotiated settlements 
that are neither transparent nor approved by all shareholders. 
B. Misuse of Information 
Effective collaboration also requires that, in some cases, corporate 
insiders share firm-specific information with investors. This information 
sharing can take various forms. Corporate insiders who meet privately with 
investors may provide those investors with nonpublic information during 
those discussions. Shareholders that gain access to corporate insiders, such 
as by identifying representatives to serve as directors or board observers, are 
also likely to receive nonpublic information about the corporation, its 
operations, and business strategy on an ongoing basis. 
Perhaps the most obvious concern raised by information sharing is that 
shareholders may use the information to obtain a trading advantage. A variety 
of empirical studies report that shareholders who meet privately with insiders 
obtain trading advantages.257 Although these studies focus primarily on 
interactions that are oriented toward informing trading decisions, such as 
meetings with research analysts, shareholder use of information access for 
the purpose of trading is a serious concern. In addition, a recent article 
analyzes the specific context of the appointment of activist nominees to a 
company’s board of directors and finds that such appointments are associated 
with information leakage into stock prices.258 
The federal securities laws address the misuse of firm-specific 
information in two ways. First, insiders who disclose information to 
shareholders in circumstances in which that information is likely to be used 
in securities trading violate Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD).259 
Regulation FD makes it unlawful for corporations and their agents to provide 
 
257. E.g., Jihwon Park & Eugene Soltes, What Do Investors Ask Managers Privately? 7 
(Dec. 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.shareholderforum.com/access/Library/ 
20171206_Park&Soltes.pdf [https://perma.cc/JMM8-H33D] (“A body of prior academic literature 
finds that investors who gain access to managers privately make more informed trades.”). 
258. John C. Coffee, Jr. et al., Activist Directors and Agency Costs: What Happens When an 
Activist Director Goes on the Board?, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 381, 422 (2019); see also Coffee, 
supra note 99, at 17 (identifying similar concerns). 
259. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2018). 
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certain kinds of selective disclosure to shareholders.260 Second, federal law 
may impose insider trading liability upon both insiders who tip material 
nonpublic information to shareholders and the shareholders that trade on that 
information. 
The disclosure of nonpublic corporate information raises concerns 
beyond securities trading, however.261 Shareholders may misuse information 
in other ways.262 Shareholders may, for example, use that information 
selfishly to gain an advantage for a competing portfolio company. A 
shareholder may also simply be careless or sloppy with the information in a 
way that harms the interests of the company. One highly publicized example 
of information misuse that was not linked to trading involved Bill Ackman, 
then a director of J.C. Penney, leaking confidential board information to the 
press.263 
These concerns have led to a reluctance by the boards of some 
companies to share information with shareholders. A company may go so far 
as to adopt a policy under which insiders do not meet privately with investors. 
Sturm Ruger cited such a confidentiality policy, for example, as the basis for 
refusing to meet with large shareholders who were concerned about its 
firearms-manufacturing policies.264 Ruger’s confidentiality policy states that 
it is expressly motivated, in part, by the need to comply with Regulation 
FD.265 
Of course, shareholders need not meet privately with insiders to 
collaborate. Shareholders can communicate their information or objectives to 
companies through letters, emails, or public statements, but these efforts are 
likely to be less effective at persuading insiders to reconsider their 
 
260. Id. 
261. Shareholders may also use information to obtain a trading advantage in another of their 
portfolio companies. 
262. One paper, for example, finds evidence that hedge funds anticipate analyst reports with 
high information content and posits that the explanation for this finding is that hedge funds 
“strategically disclose their private information to sell-side analysts . . . in order to speed the 
incorporation of private information into stock prices.” Nathan Swem, Information in Financial 
Markets: Who Gets It First? 24 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. Fin. & Econ. Discussion 
Series, Working Paper No. 023, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939519 [https://perma.cc/Z8C2-
APT4]. 
263. Priya Cherian Huskins, Boardroom Confidential: Directors and Their Duty, WOODRUFF, 
SAWYER & CO. (Sept. 13, 2016), https://wsandco.com/do-notebook/boardroom-confidential/ 
[https://perma.cc/F2P5-MRZE]. 
264. Sturm, Ruger & Co. (RGR) Q1 2018 Results - Earnings Call Transcript, SEEKING ALPHA 
(May 9, 2018, 6:43 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4171931-sturm-ruger-and-co-rgr-q1-
2018-results-earnings-call-transcript?part=single [https://perma.cc/3GTC-KCKD] (“We don’t do – 
we don’t go meet with the big institutional shareholders, we don’t hold meetings with our largest 
institutional shareholders like BlackRock or Vanguard.” (quoting CEO Christopher John Killoy)). 
265. RUGER, INVESTMENT COMMUNITY COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 2019, at 1 (2019), https:// 
ruger.com/corporate/PDF/InvestorCommunicationPolicy.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BZX-A2XN]. 
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positions.266 Moreover, the refusal of corporate insiders to meet privately 
with shareholders prevents the deliberation that distinguishes shareholder 
collaboration from other methods of communication. 
Even when insiders meet privately with shareholders, however, they 
need not share material nonpublic information. The SEC guidelines explicitly 
state that Regulation FD does not prevent insiders from engaging privately 
with shareholders and offers procedural suggestions designed to prevent the 
accidental disclosure of nonpublic information such as preapproving topics 
for meeting and ensuring the presence of legal counsel.267 For some investors, 
such as mutual funds, meetings that do not involve the dissemination of 
nonpublic information by corporate officials are likely to be optimal for both 
companies and investors because they both protect companies from potential 
securities liability and ensure that investors do not give up their ability to 
trade. Indeed, even without disclosing nonpublic information, private 
meetings enable insiders to probe investor preferences, explore the reasons 
for their positions, as well as provide investors with reasons why their 
preferences may not be consistent with the company’s best interests. 
The situation may differ for hedge funds. Like mutual funds, some 
hedge funds may prefer to avoid obtaining material nonpublic information to 
preserve their ability to trade268 and may explicitly request that companies 
not divulge any nonpublic information in their private meetings. Moreover, 
not every hedge fund collaboration requires insiders to disclose nonpublic 
information. For example, if a hedge fund is seeking to influence operational 
decisions, it is likely, at least in the initial stages of collaboration, to be 
providing rather than seeking information, as evidenced by the fund’s 
 
266. See McCahery et al., supra note 157, at 2906 (presenting survey results in which 
shareholders report their frequent use of private engagements with management and directors and 
describe those engagements as important). 
267. See Regulation FD, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/ 
guidance/regfd-interp.htm [https://perma.cc/EG78-PZSA] (last updated June 4, 2010). As put by 
one asset manager, when the SEC guidelines are taken into account, Regulation FD concerns sound 
“more of an excuse cited by issuers than an actual obstacle.” MARC GOLDSTEIN, INSTITUTIONAL 
S’HOLDER SERVS., THE STATE OF ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN U.S. CORPORATIONS AND 
SHAREHOLDERS 20 (2011), https://www.weinberg.udel.edu/IIRCiResearchDocuments/2015/09/ 
IRRC-ISS_EngagementStudy1.pdf [https://perma.cc/PGV7-UQKV]. 
268. Hedge fund representatives are well aware that their access to confidential information 
may limit their ability to trade. For example, Mark Cuban reportedly responded after allegedly 
receiving confidential information about Mamma.com’s planned PIPE offering, “Well, now I’m 
screwed. I can’t sell.” Rachelle Younglai & Robert MacMillan, SEC Charges Mark Cuban with 
Insider Trading, REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2008, 6:10 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec-
markcuban/sec-charges-mark-cuban-with-insider-trading-idUSTRE4AG5IM20081118 [https:// 
perma.cc/3NEU-FJ5L]. Cuban was subsequently charged with insider trading, but a jury determined 
that he was not liable. Jana J. Pruet, Billionaire Mark Cuban Cleared of Insider Trading; Blasts 
U.S. Government, REUTERS (Oct. 16, 2013, 2:44 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-sec-
cuban-verdict/billionaire-mark-cuban-cleared-of-insider-trading-blasts-u-s-government-
idUSBRE99F0ZM20131016 [https://perma.cc/8RHR-45WH]. 
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frequent preparation of extensive business plans and proposals.269 
Nonetheless, some collaborations require two-way communication of the 
private information possessed by both investors and insiders. Because of the 
hedge fund’s prior investment in developing firm-specific information as 
well as its likely expertise, engagement is likely to be most productive when 
the company and the fund can share their partial information to deliberate 
and aggregate that information. Moreover, when hedge fund representatives 
serve as directors or board observers, they necessarily will become privy to 
material nonpublic information. 
Insiders have cited the potential misuse of information as a basis for 
limiting the access of activist directors to confidential firm information.270 
Some companies have even responded to the appointment of activist directors 
by forming executive committees of the board to “wall off” an activist 
director from information or deliberations.271 Legally, however, activist 
directors are entitled to equal access to corporate information as their fellow 
directors in order to fulfill their fiduciary obligations to the company.272 
Activist directors are unlikely to collaborate effectively without such access. 
A more complex issue concerns the ability of hedge fund directors or 
representatives to share information with others at their fund. Recall that the 
collaborative model relies on the fact that shareholders supply 
complementary information due to their information advantages in the 
market, expertise, and differential knowledge base. This information is not 
contained within the brains of the hedge fund’s directors but located 
throughout the fund. For activist directors to operate effectively, they must 
be able to evaluate company-specific information in the context of the fund’s 
knowledge base. This necessarily will involve sharing firm-specific 
information with other fund representatives. 
Whether such sharing is legally permissible has been the subject of 
extensive debate. A number of commentaries have claimed that constituency 
 
269. As Trian principal Ed Garden explains, the purpose of Trian’s initial private meetings with 
management is to explain its analysis. “We want to get their opinion of our work. After all, we’ve 
done this from the outside and don’t have perfect information. We’d rather be rich than right.” LUIS 
M. VICEIRA ET AL., HARV. BUS. SCH., TRIAN PARTNERS AND DUPONT (A) (2017). 
270. See, e.g., Lindsay Frost, Activist-Appointed Directors Causing Confidentiality Concerns, 
AGENDA (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename= 
AgendaWeek-040416.pdf&type=subsite [https://perma.cc/6JDR-WYP4]. 
271. E.g., Christopher P. Skroupa, Onboarding an Activist-Nominated Director — Best 
Practices, Risks and Mistakes to Avoid, SKYTOP STRATEGIES (Jan. 23, 2018), https:// 
skytopstrategies.com/onboarding-an-activist-nominated-director-best-practices-risks-mistakes-to-
avoid/ [https://perma.cc/Q7KF-MSFY] (explaining that “[t]he formation of an executive committee 
effectively walls off the activist investor’s nominees from most of the board’s deliberations”). 
272. E.g., Hall v. Search Capital Grp., Inc., No. 15264, 1996 WL 696921, at *2 (Del. Ch. 
Nov. 15, 1996) (“When management communicates with the directors on matters of concern to the 
Board collectively, it cannot pick and choose which directors will receive that information. Absent 
a governance agreement to the contrary, each director is entitled to receive the same information 
furnished to his or her fellow board members.”). 
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directors navigate in perilous waters in transmitting information to their 
sponsors.273 Overall, however, the relevant case law seems to suggest that 
activist directors are permitted to share firm information with their 
sponsors.274 After all, as observed by Vice Chancellor Travis Laster and Mark 
Zeberkiewicz, a rule against information sharing would be both unrealistic275 
and potentially detrimental.276 
Confidentiality agreements can address the concern that an activist 
director or fund may misuse material nonpublic information. Indeed, the use 
of such agreements is common practice when companies find it beneficial to 
communicate material nonpublic information to shareholders.277 For 
example, after Trian’s unsuccessful proxy contest against DuPont, DuPont 
officials invited Trian to collaborate with them in developing the structure of 
DuPont’s subsequent merger with Dow Chemical and split into three 
independent companies.278 Because the fact and terms of the merger and the 
subsequent spin-offs were, at the time of these negotiations, nonpublic and 
highly market sensitive, Trian participated pursuant to a confidentiality 
agreement.279 
 
273. See Robert Little & Chris Babcock, Walking the High Wire: Guidelines for Board of 
Director Designees of Private Equity Funds, Activist Stockholders and Other Investors, 44 SEC. 
REG. & L. REP. 2245, 2246 (2012) (claiming that directors’ duty of confidentiality to the company 
prevents directors from sharing confidential information with anyone who is adverse to the 
company, even when the adverse parties are significant stockholders); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, 
supra note 243, at 773–74 (describing the tension between directors’ duty to protect confidential 
information and their responsibility to be their sponsors’ “eyes and ears”). 
274. See, e.g., Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d 196, 208–09 (Del. 2008) (implicitly confirming that 
constituency directors can share information with their sponsors); Kalisman v. Friedman, C.A. No. 
8447-VCL, 2013 WL 1668205, at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 2013) (“When a director serves as the 
designee of a stockholder on the board, and when it is understood that the director acts as the 
stockholder’s representative, then the stockholder is generally entitled to the same information as 
the director.”). 
275. See J. Travis Laster & John Mark Zeberkiewicz, The Rights and Duties of Blockholder 
Directors, 70 BUS. LAW. 33, 52–53, 55 (2015) (“This rule reflects the practical reality that director 
representatives in both public and private companies routinely share confidential corporate 
information with colleagues at their affiliated investment funds.”). 
276. Id. at 55 (arguing that a rule against information sharing would entail both a breach of duty 
of blockholder directors as corporate insiders and investors’ fiduciaries). 
277. See Jordan Schoenfeld, Action-Based Contracts Between Firms and Shareholders 19 
(Dec. 2018) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.bm.ust.hk/acct/files/Accounting%20 
Symposium/2018/_Shareholder_Contracts.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS7J-4UHU]. 
278. David Benoit, Dow, DuPont Deal Cements Activists’ Rise, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11, 2015, 
9:52 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/dow-dupont-deal-cements-activists-rise-1449882586 
[https://perma.cc/3AN5-KBEA]. 
279. DowDuPont Inc., Final Proxy Statement/Prospectus 73 (Form 424B3) (June 10, 2016) 
(describing meetings between a DuPont executive, a DuPont financial advisor, and four Trian 
representatives, pursuant to a nondisclosure agreement to discuss, inter alia, “strategic rationale of 
the product portfolios and the optimal allocation of businesses among the public companies 
resulting from the potential post-merger separation”). 
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Confidentiality agreements largely address legal and practical concerns 
over the potential misuse of information.280 The SEC has explicitly stated that 
confidentiality agreements are an appropriate way for insiders to limit their 
potential liability exposure under Regulation FD.281 Similarly, SEC rule 
10b5–2 prohibits anyone who receives material nonpublic information 
pursuant to a confidentiality agreement from trading on that information.282 
Accordingly, the use of a confidentiality agreement clarifies both the fact that 
investors may not use confidential information from their collaborations with 
insiders for the purpose of securities trading and the terms on which investors 
may share information, such as to others at their firm.283 For the hedge fund 
activist, a confidentiality standstill agreement is also likely to be valuable in 
that it provides an enforceable commitment by the activist to maintain its 
equity position in the issuer as it seeks to work to effect change. 
Confidentiality agreements are not a perfect solution to concerns about 
the misuse of corporate information, however. First, insistence on 
confidentiality agreements as a prerequisite to engagement may chill 
potentially valuable collaborations. As noted above, many investors have 
liquidity needs that prevent them from limiting their ability to trade, and as a 
result, they cannot sign a confidentiality agreement as a condition to meeting 
privately with insiders. Second, there is a risk that confidentiality agreements 
will be overused. Although collaborating shareholders should not misuse 
information, they should not be held to a higher standard than insiders. 
Corporate officials are free to trade in their company’s stock with appropriate 
safeguards such as a requirement that trades be preapproved or take place 
only during specified trading windows.284 Collaborating investors should also 
 
280. Coffee et al. also find evidence that the use of confidentiality agreements in negotiated 
settlements of proxy contests is correlated with less information leakage following the appointment 
of hedge-fund-nominated directors to the board. Coffee et al., supra note 258, at 423–24. 
281. Regulation FD, supra note 268 (“[B]ecause Regulation FD does not apply to disclosures 
made to a person who expressly agrees to maintain the disclosed information in confidence, a private 
communication between an independent director and a shareholder would not present Regulation 
FD issues if the shareholder provided such an express agreement.”). 
282. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5–2 (2018). 
283. See, e.g., David A. Katz, Boardroom Confidentiality Under Focus, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 23, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2014/01/23/ 
boardroom-confidentiality-under-focus/ [https://perma.cc/9GJV-7XRT] (“Having a detailed and 
robust board confidentiality policy will serve both to advise directors (and their sponsors, if any) as 
to their obligations with respect to sensitive board information and to create a board culture that 
views leaking as unacceptable and dishonorable behavior.”). For example, when Pershing Square 
named Stephen Fraidin to the board of Valeant as part of a settlement agreement, Fraidin wrote a 
letter to then-CEO Michael Pearson stating: “I hereby undertake, consistent with my fiduciary duties 
and confidentiality obligations as a Valeant director, to refrain from communicating to anyone 
(whether to any company in which we have an investment or otherwise) confidential information I 
learn in my capacity as a director of Valeant; provided that I may communicate such information to 
members of my firm, Pershing Square.” Frost, supra note 270 (emphasis added). 
284. Corporate officers and directors are also subject to the short-swing trading limitations of 
§ 16(b). 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2018). Those restrictions apply equally to activist-nominated directors. 
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be free to trade on these terms. Along similar lines, Delaware law imposes a 
duty of confidentiality on directors as part of their duty of loyalty.285 That 
duty requires all directors, including shareholder-nominated directors, to 
maintain material company information confidential without the need for a 
confidentiality agreement.286 Finally, some commentators have raised the 
concern that issuers may use confidentiality agreements to “oppress 
directors,”287 although such a concern appears more likely when a hedge fund 
has obtained board seats through confrontation rather than collaboration. 
C. Collusion 
Lastly, shareholders and insiders may also use collaboration to engage 
in collusive behavior—behavior that is contrary to the interests of other 
shareholders or the public generally. A developing literature, initiated by two 
papers examining the airline and banking industries respectively, explores 
the possibility that institutional investors may collude to reduce 
competition.288 The argument in these papers, which focus primarily on 
mutual funds, is that common ownership creates an incentive for investors to 
favor anticompetitive behavior to generate monopolistic profits.289 Notably, 
these profits have the potential to benefit both insiders and investors. The 
authors support their theory by showing that the airline and banking 
industries have experienced increased ownership concentration and, at the 
same time, reduced competition.290 Although the literature is too extensive to 
examine here, and we note that the empirical results of the Azar et al. research 
 
285. Cyril Moscow, Director Confidentiality, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 2011, at 197, 
200. The duty of confidentiality is part of a director’s general duty of loyalty. Sepe, supra note 58, 
at 344; see also Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty, 
11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 675, 693 (2009); Charles M. Nathan, Maintaining Board Confidentiality, HARV. 
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 23, 2010), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ 
corpgov/2010/01/23/maintaining-board-confidentiality [https://perma.cc/F76K-6ARR]. 
286. See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 12 (Del. 1998) (“The directors’ duty to disclose 
all available material information in connection with a request for shareholder action must be 
balanced against its concomitant duty to protect the corporate enterprise, in particular, by keeping 
certain financial information confidential.”); COMM. ON CORP. LAWS, ABA SECTION OF BUS. LAW, 
CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK (5th ed. 2007), reprinted in 62 BUS. LAW. 1479, 1500 (2007) 
(“A director must keep confidential all matters involving the corporation that have not been 
disclosed to the public.”). 
287. Frost, supra note 270 (quoting director Charles Elson). 
288. See generally José Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anti-Competitive Effects of 
Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513 (2018) [hereinafter Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects] (airline 
industry); José Azar, Sahil Raina & Martin C. Schmalz, Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition 
(May 4, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2710252 [https://perma.cc/ 
G2YH-RQNQ] [hereinafter Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership] (banking industry). 
289. Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 289, at 1514; Azar et al., Ultimate 
Ownership, supra note 289, at 2. 
290. Azar et al., Anticompetitive Effects, supra note 289, at 1517; Azar et al., Ultimate 
Ownership, supra note 289, at 2–3. 
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have been challenged on a variety of bases,291 the bottom line is that collusion 
between insiders and investors is possible and the novel collaborative 
patterns that we describe in this Article may offer an important vehicle for 
collusion. 
Conclusion 
Both the prevailing models of the public corporation frame the insider–
shareholder relationship in terms of a competitive struggle. On this shared 
premise, the “battle” between defendants of each model focuses on the 
question of the appropriate allocation of power between corporate insiders 
and shareholders to reduce the risk of managerial moral hazard. 
This Article showed that the reality of the insider–shareholder dynamic 
has turned increasingly collaborative. In a coherent, if unheralded, effort, 
insiders and newly empowered shareholders are joining forces to promote 
deliberative mechanisms for increasing firm value through a variety of means 
that include shareholder engagement, private initiatives to develop shared 
governance principles, and “constructivist” activism. Despite these dramatic 
transformations, corporate law scholars have paid limited attention to 
shareholder collaboration. This Article provided a first attempt at remedying 
this gap, exploring the implications of the rise of shareholder collaboration. 
Descriptively, the rise of collaboration in the public corporation is not a 
casual occurrence but can be traced back to the VC context, where founders 
and investors have long developed structures to promote joint decision-
making. Changes in the public-company context have expanded the role of 
collaboration. Under these changes, the normative task is no longer only to 
determine the appropriate balance of shareholder and manager power. 
Rather, it is also to determine the best way to aggregate the partial and 
complementary information that insiders and shareholders are likely to 
possess in a world of complex investments and reconcentrated equity 
ownership. As this Article has shown, collaboration offers a means to that 
end that neither unilateral decision-making nor the mediated transmission of 
information through markets can provide. 
Policywise, the collaborative model has several implications. By 
enhancing shareholder influence over firm decisions, collaboration creates 
the potential for conflicts of interest, the risk that shareholders may misuse 
firm-specific information, and the possibility of collusive behavior. Existing 
corporate law tools such as fiduciary duties and confidentiality agreements 
 
291. See, e.g., Patrick Dennis et al., Common Ownership Does Not Have Anti-Competitive 
Effects in the Airline Industry 34 (Aug. 14, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3063465 [https://perma.cc/RVS4-Y776] (critiquing the Azar et al. airline study); Edward 
B. Rock & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Defusing the Antitrust Threat to Institutional Investor Involvement 
in Corporate Governance 2 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working 
Paper No. 17-05, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2925855 [https://perma.cc/WD2W-LZR7] 
(same). 
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are poorly designed to address these concerns without sacrificing the 
potential value of collaboration. Consequently, the growing importance of 
collaboration requires rethinking and adapting several existing principles of 
corporate law. This Article begins the task; we hope that its observations can 
provide a starting point for much needed future research on the new 
collaborative model of the public corporation. 
